

**“ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA” UNIVERSITY OF IA I  
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL – POLITICAL SCIENCES**

# **DOCTORAL THESIS**

## **ABSTRACT**

**Scientific Coordinator:**

**Professor PhD Carmen COZMA**

**PhD Candidate:**

**Ana CARAS (c s. FRUNZ )**

**2014**

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# **A Deconstructive Approach of Ethical Values.**

## **Ethics expertise**

### **Abstract**

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## Introduction

The central element of the paper is represented by the deconstructive process of ethical constitutive values of practices in social services, from the perspective of various approaches of ethics expertise.

We were interested primarily in a transdisciplinary perspective on the ethics of public service, having as starting point a philosophical method of semiotic and phenomenological type. Semiotic approach, favored at least in the first part of the paper, is related to the analysis of social semantics implied by the deconstruction- (re)construction of ethical values. The phenomenological perspective aimed at anchoring the ethical values in their significance for the human consciousness from the perspective of Individual-Other relationship. The deconstruction method, approached in the present paper, is original in Derridean philosophy, showing two stages of deconstruction. We chose deconstruction as a method of philosophizing, with the aim of establishing, in terms of ontology, the possibility of any ethics expertise. From here, we will accede to the idea of *ethics expertise*, formulating as own contribution, a model of *supervision of ethics*. The simple deconstruction completed by reduction ad absurdum of the "founding myths of modernity" cannot realize the complexity of ethics required in the knowledge-based society. Karl-Otto Apel himself shows that the simple deconstruction of the myth of progress leads to a standstill, since the linear progress of society and the social forces implicated by it, is interrupted by the qualitative leap generated by the appearance of collective moral consciousness and of ethics of collective responsibility. Therefore, we attached the deconstructive phase, a phase of identification of social semantics that the constitutive values of the western society, among which *liberty*, *duty*, *charity*, *justice*, have in the new context of secularization of society and generalizing responsibility towards the other and the future.

We identified, for example, the fact that in its deconstruction, *charity*, as meta-story about the good Christian, takes the shape of reconstruction of social solidarity and of assistential state, as a form of exercising institutional and public responsibility of the community towards the individual. Of course, social solidarity can also be deconstructed, but this *ad infinitum* deconstruction can be stopped

only by understanding the way in which the social meaning of the value in question is constructed. At this level we placed the semiotic perspective when we identified the semantic constructions that give meaning to ethical reception and justifies the need for ethics expertise.

In defining ethics expertise, we started from the acceptations given by Norbert L. Steinkamp and his collaborators to the clinic ethics expertise. The authors cited understand the ethics expertise as being the practice that improves and offers specificity to the ethicists, on own expertise, contributing to the improvement of perceptions on the moral competences of non-ethicists and offering new optics on certain complementary argumentative styles, both ethicists and non-ethicists, contributing in the end to the acknowledgment of issues of professional development of ethicists.

The ethics expertise is generally developed starting from the context of clinical ethics where it appeared with necessity due to the awareness of ethical risks that the medical practice can lead to, in the context of unprecedented development of certain areas such as genetics, reproductive medicine, technology of transplant of organs and nano-technology. Precisely due to this risks, the ethical consciousness in the medical field has developed more rapidly, generating the need for certain strategies of ethical decision that will allow a non-ethicist to justify to their own consciousness, but also in front of a constrictive alterity, the choices he has made.

The great ethical theories grounded in philosophy offer perspectives of development of bioethical theories such as ethical practices, constituting a passing point between the ethicist expert and the professional whose activity implicates the ethical decision, but whose initial training is resumed to at most one course of ethics.

Simultaneously with the bioethical development and clinical ethics, another branch of applied ethics is the ethics of professions, which gains a strong voice in the public space precisely due to the awakening of ethical consciousness to the level of society and acknowledgment of the need to implement social practices in the sphere of ethical responsibility. Karl-Otto Apel draws the attention to the awareness of the need for responsibility towards the sustainable development – starting from the field of environment and encompassing all areas of society – that generate a new approach of ethics that can be understood as ethics of social responsibility. The “twilight of duty”, noticed by Gilles Lipovetsky, doesn’t remain in a

society of generalized permissiveness, but on the contrary, it takes the form of an ethics of the individual that develops through a process of deconstruction-(re)construction, from the level of an *ethics of the individual*, to the one of an *ethics of consensus*. Acknowledging this particularity of actual ethical development, we followed in the first part of the paper the deconstruction of ethical values in their quality of meta-stories, that influence social practice, and in the same time social (re)construction of values from the perspective of discursive ethics, based on the social reconstruction of reality. I aimed to highlight the deconstructive-(re)constructive process of values such as: *autonomy, justice, responsibility*. These values are seen as being constitutive for the practices that target social welfare of individuals and communities. Among these practices we mention social care, social pedagogy, clinical psychology and psycho-social intervention, public health, in a wider sense, any public service.

We focused on habermasian understanding of communicative action as the basis of ethics expertise, formulating the *supervision of ethics*, as a form of communicative action. The term *supervision of ethics* was shaped by Frederic Reamer, from whom we took and adapted it in the context of ethics expertise.

The term *supervision* can be interpreted in a manner of imbalance of power, from foucaldian perspective, as overview and supervision. We prefer to attribute this practice of ethics expertise, a value of mediation of ethical communication, *supervisio*, or *vision from above*, being rather correlated with oscillation between the ontological statutes of different individual and collective entities, contained in the act of ethical communication.

One of the contributions brought by this paper targets the construction of a model of ethics expertise based on the Habermas' theory of communicative action that partially fulfill the functions of ethics committees, of ethics audit and of counseling of ethics, fulfilling these functions in the continuous training and monitoring of specialists whose activity implies making ethical decisions, covering permanently their needs of counseling, evaluation and support, employment in the ethical norms of the conducted professions, etc.

As limits of this paper that will be overcome in future researches, we bring into discussion the construction that remained at the level of project of supervision of ethics, that didn't pass the phenomenological and epistemic test to real social practice. It would

have been desirable to deepen the phenomenological side with a perspective of social phenomenology, where we would be interested in internalizing values of supervision of ethics and of ethics expertise in general, by practitioner ethicists. In this regard, we show that in conformity with the Romanian legislation, counseling of ethics is compulsory for public servants, but in practice this limits a series of information regarding professional deontology, and in the best case, training of ethics and conformity, minimal in ethical content with philosophical foundation.

It is desirable that the field of ethics expertise to be developed at the level of social services, defined as field of favorite ethical action which transfers public politics in social action, in favour of the beneficiary, and therefore need validation of ethical consensus and practice of ethical *gatekeeping*.

We presented in this paper the theoretical perspective and philosophical origins of ethics expertise, refraining from entering the methodological sphere that belongs to applied ethics, presenting only partially certain models of ethics expertise, and so that in future, more in depth, researches, to approach also the side of effective implementation and validation of this ethical methods, in the case of these models whose implementation was not validated yet by the scientific community.

Other original contributions brought by this paper consist in trying to build a model of ethics expertise with focus on social services, while the literature is very poor, the outstanding contributions being the ones of Frederic Reamer, therefore we had to extend the area of reference research to the general field of ethics expertise, and the one of social ethics and social policies. In this regard we built a model based on the correlation between constitutive, operational values, and the ethical principles applicable at the level of social practices. This model was extended in the construction of a syntax of ethics expertise, that can be extrapolated at the level of applied ethics, to any social practice.

The deconstructive-(re)constructive model proposed is also original, being fundamented in the article “Deconstruction of charity. Postmodern Ethical Approaches” and used in extenso in the entire thesis.

Also, we built a model of counseling of ethics published in the article „Philosophical Practice and Social Welfare Counselling and

Supervision of Ethics”, but also the model of supervision of ethics developed in the articles “Perspectives for Reconstruction of Ethics expertise” and “Epistemic and Pragmatic Backgrounds of Supervision of Ethics”.

Regarding the professional supervision, from which it started the intuition of possibility of supervision of ethics as ethical expertise, we mention the article “The Role of Supervision in Professional Development of Social Work Specialists”.

## **Part 1. Deconstruction of Ethical Values**

First part of the paper includes a constitutive framework of the ethics expertise applied in the social sphere, the deconstruction of representative ethical values being developed gradually, as we considered them to be: liberty – deconstructed in relational autonomy, moral autonomy developed in stages, psycho-social autonomy, and autonomy in relation to the manifestation of responsibilities towards the Other; duty and charity – deconstructed into responsibility and social solidarity; justice – deconstructed into justice as equity, justification, procedure.

### **1. Deconstruction of Liberty in Autonomy**

In the context of approaching autonomy as a result of deconstruction of liberty, we target the identification of autonomy in whose determination the ethical expert can intervene, and implicitly the supervisor of ethics. If in the sphere of moral philosophy, Kant fundamental morality on practical reason, we showed that in the sphere of applied sciences, the emphasis was on the need for analyzing morality, starting from the human behaviour of individuals facing different moral dilemmas.

In the development of the concept of relational autonomy of the client of social services, we support his capacity to act autonomously in the social space according to the limits imposed by the community, to negotiate these limits with other members of his interpretative community. We showed how in this context, the

supervisor of ethics could be the specialist's instance of support in understanding the heteronomy-autonomy dynamics.

Another form of deconstruction of liberty was identified as autonomy as a staged process of moral development, approaching mainly Lawrence Kohlberg's theory on moral development, which we considered significant from the perspective of the possibility of constructing models of ethics expertise based on the development of the individual's autonomy under an welfare process. We used the staged model of Kohlberg that proposed the understanding of moral development of the individual as a development of his moral consciousness, starting from the distinction between heteronomy-autonomy and the implications of the behaviour on the capacity of moral agent. Related to this model, we built a staged model of the relationship of supervision as a form of the relationship with the authority, from the perspective of constructing an ethical practice that converges into ethical professional autonomy of the supervised.

In the deconstructive-(re)constructive process of liberty as constitutive ethical value, we identified autonomy as psycho-social self-development. This, through the specific of the updating tendency – as a driving force in the theory of progressive self-development in the dynamic of personality – and the relationship I-Other – in the construction of a theory of personality – we relate to the Levinasian approach on responsibility.

We noticed the correlation between the principle of respect for autonomy and the one of responsibility, starting from the Levinasian and Rogersian approach, while outlining the I-Other axis, to which the supervision of ethics intervenes in developing a triad. In a triadic form, the supervisor of ethics becomes the third point, representing the unseen alterity – from the perspective of the client, and the co-creating instance of the ethical sense of practice – from the perspective of the professional.

The social-moral responsibility towards the autonomy of the individual is identified as being originated in the care for the Other, justifying the social practices based on the theory of care.

We reported to the supervision of care from an ethical perspective, discussing the dilemmas generated by the I-Alterity relationship between the counselor and the beneficiary, one of the roles of the supervisor being to ensure emotional-reflective balance and moral intensity in the relationship between the counselor and the

beneficiary in the context of constructing autonomy. We considered the Levinasian alterity as being one of the constitutive values of social, developed around the principle of responsibility, being operationalized in fact by the care towards the other.

## **2. The Deconstruction of Duty and Charity in Responsibility**

Following the undertaken deconstructive process, it emerged the deconstruction of duty and charity as responsibility and social solidarity at the level of social practices. The deconstruction of ethical duty started from the Kantian approach, the individual duty that implies good will, Kant arguing the difficulty in making a distinction between the actions out of duty of selfish interest. The Kantian moral duty is based on a generic practical reason, un-contextual for the real social individual, him, as a moral agent, not claiming his decisions on practical reason, but being influenced by preferences, preconceptions, social environment, etc.

We used the Lipovetskian approach of duty to exemplify how, in the conditions of deconstructing any form of structure imposed by the postmodern society, a post-moralist ethics arises, targeting not the duty of the individual, but the general permissiveness of the society.

We reflected, in this chapter, on the transformation of society in general, into a hyper-market centred on distributing paradoxical happiness. The marketed good of the hyper-consumerist society can be represented by social services that are offered by the institutions to the vulnerable populations – captive clients of some “social hypermarkets”. Social services represent and instrument of transposing the values of justice, equity, responsibility, from the level of social philosophy to the one of social action, as a result of the transition from social care towards social economy, social practice becoming an instance of normalizing the access to opportunities.

The twilight of moral duty announced by Lipovetsky that leads to the transformation of postmodern society into one of general permissiveness, is completed by Hans Jonas through technological singularity – the self-destructive capacity of the human kind due to the technological development – and the need for an ethics based on collective responsibility. Taking into consideration the development of an ethics adapted to globalization, we approached the possibility of

ethical (re)construction in the communicative action. If the first part of the deconstruction of duty targets responsibility in individual, communitarian and social parameters, now we bring into discussion the need for extending the responsibility of the individual to a global level, converging to a model of co-responsibility as understood by Karl-Otto Apel. In the construction of the model of co-responsibility, Karl-Otto Apel is based on the theory of communicative action developed by Jurgen Habermas, arguing the need for discursive ethics in funding his model. We considered it necessary to state a new position, contrary to Apel, who wants to build a new responsibility – a global one – of the collectivity, in the detriment of individual responsibility, since we consider that, in fact, individual responsibility is the one that leads to the development of collective responsibility, of co-responsibility in Apel's opinion.

We identified the crossing towards the ethics of care as a form of duty deconstructed in responsibility, ever since Karl-Otto Apel's approach on collective responsibility, which even though it uses Kohlberg's studies on moral development, it doesn't take into consideration the following studies developed by his discipol, Carol Gilligan, who builds a model of ethics of care from a feminist perspective, starting in fact from the individual's responsibility towards the other, manifested by care. The duty towards the Other is converted into care for the other, described by the shared responsibility of each of us for the power or moral weaknesses of each member of the society, based on moral inter-dependency, as Nel Noddings approaches the ethics of care.

Deconstructed as social responsibility, but also as social solidarity, charity was the ethical value by whose analysis we highlighted the shift from Christian approach of social services, to their professionalization, by the secularization of charity practices. We followed the deconstruction of the Christian idea of charity from two perspectives, namely the secularization of charity practices, and the constructive fundament of a particular meta-story of the current society.

### **3. The Deconstruction of justice**

We made a transition from pre-modernity to modernity of the concept of *justice*, being highlighted through the transfer of power, from the divine sphere to the secular one, from justice in pre-modernity, as a sacred prerogative of sovereignty, as a representative of supreme divinity, towards a form of doing justice, removed from divine considerations. Defining justice is done in report to the issue of respecting certain sets of rules, either legal, regulations, instructions for behaviour or action.

As a form of exercising power, justice is presented by Michel Foucault in the context of criticizing the punitive systems. Justice is interpreted in the context of relationships of power between the individual and the authority represented by the superior social hierarchic position.

From the perspective of ethics expertise, we turned to Foucault's theories as strategies of discursive normalization of the relationships of power. The relationship of power, in Foucault's vision, is included in the discourse, being the main vector in transmitting power. The discursive power is always non-symmetrical, the transmitter seeking to influence the receiver. The discourse of power is subtle along with the technology of power. Starting from this subtilization, we understand the types of action proposed by Habermas, in which communicative action that seeks consensus, implicates a relationship of maximum equality of power. However, gaining consensus is not absolutely rational, as it is stated by Habermas, in the consensual strategies intervening the seductive strategies, manipulation etc. Starting from this, we identify the need of the ethical expert as a supervisor of communicative action to maintain it in the limits of the balance of power. Supervision denounced by Foucault as a way of exercising power takes the form of supervision, as normalizing the relationship of power.

Justice in terms of *equity* was intensely debated by John Rawls, identified through a constructivist manner. In determining the principles of social justice as equity, we used constructions generating correct, relevant conclusions, the political thinker considering construction as defining part in deducting what justice really is as equity, for the members of a community.

In Nozick's opinion, justice as justification is based on the fact that the individuals are not allowed to use available goods, in terms of distribution, as they consider at some point that is right, since the goods whose distribution is targeted always belong to someone, hence not being able to be distributed.

Social justice is frequently associated to distributive justice, but Hayek considers it necessary to state that such power is not justified in the context of market economy, for example, since a model of distributive justice cannot actually exist, where no one makes any kind of distribution. The political philosopher considers the concept of "social justice" as being an expression without a content, opinion generated by the fact that there is no consensus on what social justice asks for in particular situations, there is no way to verify who is right in the case of different opinions, and the fact that there is no preconceived representation of distribution in a liberal society, the individuals not being allowed to use their own knowledge in order to achieve own purposes.

#### **4. Ethical Values in the Practice of Social Services**

Relating the ethical values that we considered constitutive to the social practice, we transposed those into contemporary practice of social services by ethical principles. Therefore, following Frederic Reamer's approach on social work, in the context of ethical principles, we identified those principles that influence the practice of social work.

We identified the principle of autonomy as a result of the deconstruction of autonomy into rational autonomy and ontological liberty, in relational autonomy and self-determination. Also, the principle of non-maleficence, together with the one of beneficence could be understood as results of the deconstruction of charity and dignity. The principle of respecting justice resulted from the deconstruction of the values of justice in equity, justification and procedural justice. Additionally to Beauchamp and Childress' principle, we took from Reamer's approach the principle of fidelity which, in our opinion, resulted from the deconstruction of faith, which, in the context of our paper, was regarded as charity, being

deconstructed in the professionalization of social work as responsibility towards the beneficiary and the agency.

## **Part II. Ethics Expertise**

The second part of the thesis - Ethics Expertise – treated instances of the ethics expertise' development in relation to social practice. We discussed the ethics expertise in considerations of ethical decision models and tools. We identified how each constituent ethical value is found in ethics expertise and may be reported to the supervision of ethics - as a model of ethics expertise.

### **1. Ethics Expertise and Social Communication. Theoretical Backgrounds**

Ethics expertise originated by philosophers in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, is debated in our times, from an epistemic approach - characterized as cognitive ability, which involves theoretical knowledge of the field - and a performative - which implies a possibility of excellence into a field. We realized, starting from Weinstein, the distinction between performative and pragmatic approach to ethics expertise, showing that performing the action is to practice ethics in the conduct of the profession, while pragmatic approach in promoting ethics in professional practice, in the relationship with the client. We also outlined the perspective of utilitarian ethics expertise or deontological, as was argued for Moore.

### **2. Ethical Decision Models**

We addressed the issue of ethical decision-making, starting from the decision theory from the political, economic, social and organizational level. Ethical decision theory involves strategic approach to decision making by offering a series of models for evaluating alternative strategies, assuming rational behaviour.

We synthesized the main theories of ethical decision and how they can be integrated in the construction of supervision of ethics, and a number of models of ethical decision, showing diverse applicability of these models in supervision of ethics in social practice.

We started from the ethical matrix as a model used in ethics deliberation on we considered a tool of ethics supervisor. In the augmentation of using ethical matrix in supervision of ethics, we used the results from practice and presented by Ben Mephram et al., ie increasing awareness of a wide range of ethical issues; encouraging ethical reflection; provide a common basis for ethical decision making; identifying areas of agreement between individuals that might be, however, different in their overall judgments; clarifying the disagreements; explaining the reasoning underlying any ethical decisions.

Based on this model of ethical matrix, and information about how this tool can be used, we built a model of the ethical matrix adapted to social services, following the course of or following the same principles, justice being understood as fairness.

### **3. Tools of Ethical Decision**

In the context of ethics expertise, we have developed, starting from Reamer, a series of frames defining ethical audit, audit including two large dimensions, the one of reflecting to the current knowledge on the ethical domain, and the one of identification of the relevance of this knowledge in daily practice, identifying ethical risks and ethical decision making.

We concluded that the audit can overlap with supervision of ethics when are built strategies which come in helping the specialist to examine the practices based on ethics, in their own professional tasks. The difference between these two forms of ethics expertise, is identified in the methodology.

Ethics auditor shows the strengths and weaknesses of the organization in terms of implementing ethical practices, formulating in organization a number of proposals to improve the practice and operation, while the supervisor aims to develop the professional ethical practices, following identification of narrative strategies of moral meanings practitioner assigns its activities.

From our point of view the supervision of ethics from this perspective may represent a normalization of positions of power and discursive position of the professional to the client and to the organization.

In the argumentation of need for informed consent in the social practices we identified action research nature of social work, which in our opinion requires compliance with customer informed decision with regard to social intervention they receive.

Likewise we have shown the importance of the constitution of ethics committees at the level of providers of social services organizations, and not just at the level of organizations such as colleges of social workers. In this perspective we showed that at the professional organizations level, are discusses, based on minimalist ethics codes, professional conduct, related to malpractice. At the organizational level, ethics committees should be based on codes of ethics and on maximalist standards of ethical conduct desirability.

#### **4. Supervision of Ethics**

The main contribution aims the construction of the supervision model, a model of ethics expertise to be applied successfully in social services.

We highlighted in the thesis the delimitation of two conceptual areas, namely supervision of ethics and ethical supervision. First is aimed at ethical practices in terms of compliance with values and constitutive principles, respectively operational, which are particular to the organization. The second conceptual area, the ethical supervision is present in professional supervision, which is itself a major ethical component.

The perspectives of supervision of ethics construction focused on epistemic and pragmatic component. From the epistemic perspective, we highlighted the possibility of supervision as communicative action, and from the pragmatic point of view we pointed that supervision of ethics aims at the support to professionals in improving performance in implementing ethics, motivating the development of an organizational environment centered on ethical values.

We understand that supervision of ethics may perform the following functions: gatekeeping of ethical policies; the construction of ethics in organizations; the mediation in achieving a balance reflected in the organization over the interests of each party; ethical

compliance monitoring; ethical counseling, support and consulting; administratively - deliberative.

We have identified a number of significations for the concept of supervision of ethics. We also identified a number of contexts in which the achievement of supervision of ethics for the social services can build a social practice closer to the values constituting the welfare professions, and whose ethical foundation is brought into the practitioners' consciousness. We have not focused on possible ethical issues in the welfare system, preferring to show the importance of ethics expertise and supervision of ethics, to obtain a good existential condition for customers.

We were able to partially identify a number of theoretical contexts belonging to contemporary philosophical paradigms, such as communicative action theory, philosophical and counseling practice, ethical decision models etc. We realized with the development of the subject its complexity and his need to restrict the analysis to several theoretical models that can build such a discursive practice. The complexity of the addressed issues required limiting us to a number of theoretical models that can be used in the construction of supervision of ethics.

## **Conclusions**

This paper aims, throughout his trial that after deconstructive- (re) constructive process of central ethical values of social services, to establish on the support of ethics expertise - developed primarily at medical sphere - a transposition of constitutive ethical values of social practice, providing ethical openness to developing expertise in social field and awareness of ethical features that govern the public sphere of contemporary society.

We started in the deconstructive- (re) constructive process from a philosophical method framed both within semiotics and social phenomenology. Structure of the thesis allows the highlighting of semiotic approach of the central ethical values chosen to be deconstructed. Phenomenological nature of the approach can be highlighted by anchoring ethical values in their significance for human consciousness in terms of individual-other relationship.

Following a semiotic approach we built a model of deconstruction of meta-stories, such as freedom, in the sense of autonomy and its forms manifested from the individual level to the relational one, duty and charity, in terms of responsibility and social solidarity, but also justice in terms of equity, entitlement and procedure.

The process was not limited to mere construction in Derridean sense, but pursued further reconstruction of new stories about social reality specific to contemporary society.

We sketched in the paper, a model of ethics expertise, called supervision of ethics. It takes as its starting point the supervision, as shown in the model of ethics expertise in social services proposed by Frederic Reamer and professional supervision, proposed by Alfred Kadushin. The proposed model aims the supervision as a form of communicative action, transfer of ethical values in their process of deconstruction- (re) construction of operational values and (ethical) principles of social practice.

We have identified ethical constitutive values of social services in a deconstructed form to establish ethics expertise frameworks, and implementation of a new model of ethics expertise that can achieve a common point of these values with professional practice through the exercise of functions that includes classical functions of ethics expertise, but also complements the development of ethical practices through mediation functions, ethical gatekeeping function, but also an administrative facilitation and deliberative process functions.

We built in the first part of the thesis - *Deconstruction of Ethical Values* - a constitutive framework of ethics expertise applied in the social sphere, gradually realizing deconstruction of representative ethical values, as we have considered to be.

In deconstructive sense, we identified *freedom* as specific meta-story specific to modernity, and have highlighted the transition from the transcendental idea of freedom to autonomy, as the product of practical reason, and subsequently forms that it manifests itself in social practice. We understood autonomy as both self- determination and as a staged process, as establishing the relational features, but also as self-development.

We had identified the Kantian vision of autonomy - as a model of individual autonomy, which is subject the autonomy of

moral conscience - emphasizing the transition to autonomy as ethical foundation of the freedom theory proposed by John Stuart Mill, the liberal view on autonomy finding his starting point in equal respect for all individuals of society. We have shown how the Millian utilitarian perspective, social services may be subject to a distribution aimed at allocating maximum well - within goods, services - to as many individuals, the role of supervision of ethics in the context of these practices an administrative one, of means testing, the efficiency of resource allocation to the various categories of beneficiaries, following criteria such as maximizing social benefit of the intervention.

We identified relational autonomy in whose determination can intervene ethical expert, and implicitly, supervisor of ethics. If within moral philosophy, Kant morality is based on a practical reason itself, we showed that the applied sciences field, emphasis was placed on the need to analyse morality based on human behaviour of individuals facing various moral dilemmas.

Relational autonomy develops, according to social - cognitive theory of moral self, in the context of ethical reasoning networking with a moral action, through emotional self-regulation mechanisms by which moral agent is exercised, but specific Bandurian relational autonomy approach lies in the constructivist nature thereof, which emphasizes the social construction of autonomy. The social construction of reality occurs in the interaction between the individual and society, teaching the individual exercises his experience is socially constructed, and types of responses of the individual are social constructs

It was observed that autonomy resulting from such individual-society interaction does not comply with the characteristics of Kantian autonomy, pure, but develops within the constructs learned, resulting relational autonomy. Influences of communicative action theory, on which we focused specifically on developing a new model of expertise ethics – supervision of ethics – as communication model were highlighted in relation to the deconstruction of freedom in relational autonomy. We highlighted in the context of relational autonomy, the framework of a moderate constructionism, which involves the idea of Habermasian communicative action, aimed at interpretative consensus, and frameworks of a radical constructionism, which

involves the social construction of reality only in the socializing instances level.

In developing the concept of relational autonomy of social services' beneficiary, we have supported its ability to act autonomously in the social space within the limits imposed by the community, to negotiate its limits interpretative with the other community members. We have shown how in this context, ethics supervisor could be an instance of support of the specialist in understanding the dynamics heteronomy- autonomy.

Another form of deconstruction of *freedom* we have identified a form of autonomy as a process of a staged moral development, mainly about Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, which I think is significant in terms of the possibility of constructing models of ethics expertise based on development of individual's autonomy, under a welfare process. We used the stage model developed by Kohlberg, which proposes understanding moral development of the individual, as a development of his moral conscience, based on the distinction heteronomous-autonomous behaviour and its implications on the ability of moral agent. Related to this model, we built a stage model of supervision as a form of relationship with the authorities, from the perspective of building an ethical practice, which converge in ethical professional autonomy of supervisee.

We identified autonomy as psychosocial self-development. This, by the specific of self- actualizing tendency - the driving force in progressive self-development theory dynamic personality - and the relation I-Other - the construction of a theory of personality - put it in relation to the Levinasian approach on responsibility.

We treated on this chapter, the construction of autonomy and responsibility of the Other and for the Other, and we identified an overlap of benchmarks set by Rogers on the relationship I-Alterity, with the vision on the same relations as ontological foundation of ethics of Levinas. We noticed how both thinkers resonates on the relationship I-Alterity, as fundamental in the development of the autonomy and individual responsibility for each other's autonomy, seen in the ontological and existential by Levinas, namely the social development by Rogers.

We noticed the correlation principle of respect for autonomy with the responsibility, based on Levinasian and Rogersian approach,

while outlining the I- Other axis, to which supervision of ethics occurs in the formation of a triad. In a triadic form, supervisor of ethics becomes the third point, representing the unseen Otherness - from a beneficiary perspective, and co-creator instance of the practice ethical sense - from the perspective of the professional.

We identified socio-moral responsibility to individual autonomy as originating in care for the Other, justifying social practices originated in the theory of care. We reported to the supervision of care from the perspective of ethical dilemmas arising in discussing the relationship I-Alterity, between counsellor and beneficiary, in the context of autonomy construction. We considered Levinasian otherness as one of incorporation of social values, developed on the responsibility principle, being operationalized in practice by caring for each other.

The deconstructive approach allowed us to follow the principle of respect for autonomy transformation from a universal principle - the very foundation of modernity - in autonomy as self-determination, social practices operational value directly derived from the dignity - as constitutive value.

In the context of social (re)construction of autonomy, supervision of ethics causes a triadic relationship Levinasian model outlining axis I-Other. We speak of a triad formation in the context of I-You- Other, the third point of the triad being the supervisor of ethics.

Relational autonomy, self-development, self-determination, autonomy as an expression of freedom, and autonomy as social responsibility towards otherness were identified by deconstructive attempts on freedom, being exposed as a series of fund its social facets.

Following deconstructive process undertaken, it became the deconstruction of duty and charity, as social responsibility and solidarity in the social practices. Deconstruction of ethical duty left from its Kantian approach, an individual duty, which implies good will, Kant saying how difficult it can be made a distinction between the actions of duty or selfish interest. Kantian moral duty is based on a generic practical reason, not contextualized to the real social individual, him as moral agent not founding his decisions on practical reason, but is influenced by preferences, preconceptions, social environment etc.

We argued the need to involve supervisor of ethics in the social services, in that judgment and professional decision should be based on moral reason, but there are factors such as the level of competence, level of occupational stress, training, that leads to the need to resort to a second professional opinion. This second opinion is in our opinion the ethics expert's opinion, implicit the supervisor of ethics.

We answered in this paper to the possible objection that supervision of ethics would be inconsistent with deontological ethics type, indicating that the supervisor will not cancel the supervisee ability of moral agent, but rather will exclude practices inconsistent with the development of client autonomy, the role of social services being to restore moral, social and functional autonomy of the client existing in a state of vulnerability.

We used the Lipovetsky approach to duty, for illustrate how in the conditions of deconstruction of all forms of structure imposed by postmodern society arises a postmoralist ethics, aimed not the individual duty, but general permissiveness of society. Duty is put under a dusk prints, which calls in the present condition of the hyper-consume society defined by a painless ethics, social responsibility development.

We removed the Kantian view of moral duty to himself, in agreement with Lipovetsky, exposing the main feature of a postmoralist society as the appetite for welfare, which legitimizes the individual right to autonomy, happiness etc. refusing rhetoric of a full austere duty.

In the context of hyper-consume society in terms of a continuum paradox - the extended individual satisfaction - we are witnessing continuous downgrading the duty of individual postmodern construction, the main guidelines are those determinant of welfare, a better life for himself and his own, issues that are central to the consumerist civilization.

We reflected, in the chapter dealing with duty deconstruction, on the transformation of society in general, in a hypermarket centred on paradoxical happiness distribution. Common market of hyper-consumerist society can be represented by social services, which are offered by specialized institutions, to vulnerable populations - captive customers of some "social hypermarkets".

Social services is an instrument for implementing the values of justice, equity, responsibility, from the social philosophy level, to that of social action as a result of the transition from welfare to social economy, social practice become normalization instance of access to opportunities.

Twilight of moral duty announced by Lipovetsky, which leads to the transformation of postmodern society in one of permissiveness generalized filled by Hans Jonas by application of a technological singularity - self-destructive capacity of mankind due to technological development - and the need for an ethics based on collective responsibility. Based on ethical considerations adapted to establish a globalization, we addressed the possibility of ethical (re) construction of responsibility in communicative action.

If the first part of deconstruction of duty targeted the responsibility at individual, community or social parameters, now is outlined the need to expand individual responsibility to globally level, converging towards a model of co-responsibility as Karl-Otto Apel understand.

In the co-responsibility model construction, Karl-Otto Apel is based on the theory of communicative action developed by Jurgen Habermas, arguing the need for discursive ethics in the model's foundation. We considered necessary to call a contrary position, wishing to build a new responsibility - global - of the community, to the detriment of individual responsibility, as we see, in fact, is the individual responsibility that leads to collective responsibility, a sense of co-responsibility in Apel's view.

The move towards the ethics of care as a form of duty deconstructed in responsibility, which we identified it since Karl-Otto Apel's collective responsibility approach, that even appeals to studies of Kohlberg's moral development, it disregard the subsequent studies developed by the Kohlberg disciple thereof, Carol Gilligan, who builds a model of feminist ethics of care, starting in fact from individual responsibility for each other, expressed through care.

Gilligan introduces the necessity of listening to different voices of society, feminine voice that differs from the male in an ethical approach to human behaviour, coming up with a new vision of ethics, moving from an ethics of justice, predominantly male voice, to an ethics of care, supported by the female voice. Duty to the other is

converted to care for each other, described the shared responsibility of each of us moral strength or weakness of each member of society, in fact based on moral interdependence, as Nel Noddings addresses ethics of care.

Deconstruction of duty targeted the (re) construction of an ethical responsibility by switching from individual moral ethics in the public space, the concept of personal duty losing side, converting moral liability in social action. Even if we are talking about individual responsibility, and including the responsibility to self, responsibility has a public and active dimension. The two concepts, the duty and responsibility are correlative, the first acting from the private sphere to the public, and the second from the public sphere to the private sphere, either all to the public.

We argued the role of supervisor of ethics in the professional practice, as the trainer of ethics in establishing the professional's empowerment. The supervisor will follow internalization of instruments of ethics, by specialist, and transferring them from the awareness of professional duty, to the construction of professional responsibility towards the client, as otherness.

Deconstructed as social responsibility, and social solidarity, charity was the ethical value through whose analysis, we highlighted the transition from Christian approach of social services to their professionalization, the secularization of charitable practices. We followed the deconstruction of the Christian idea of charity from two perspectives, namely secularization of charitable practices and constructive foundation of a particular meta-story specific to our contemporary society.

Deconstruction of justice was done in justice as fairness, as entitlement, procedure and egalitarianism. We conducted a transition from pre-modern to modern concept of justice, as evidenced by the transfer of power from the sphere of the divine to the secular justice of pre-modernity as sacred prerogative of sovereignty, as representative of the supreme deity, for a form of achieving justice, removed from the divine considerations. Definition of justice is done in relation to the issue of compliance with a set of rules, regulations, and instructions for conduct or action.

From the perspective of ethics expertise, we turned to Foucault's theories as discursive strategies normalization of relations of power. The relationship of power, according to Foucault is included

in the speech, which is the main vector for the transmission of power. Discursive power is always symmetrical, seeking to influence the receiver. Speech is power subtle itself once with the technology of power becomes subtle. From this, we understand the types of Habermas proposed action, the communicative action, which seeks consensus, implies a relationship of equality maximum power. The oversight that Foucault denounces as a way of exercising power, takes the form of supervision, as the normalization of relations of power.

Justice in terms of equity has been extensively discussed by John Rawls, identified by a constructivist manner. In determining the principles of social justice as fairness, was used relevant construction to generate correct conclusions, the political thinker considering construction as part of defining the deduction of what actually is justice as fairness for members of a community.

Relating the ethical values that we considered constitutive of social practice, the autonomy - the freedom deconstructed, social and moral responsibility and social solidarity - deconstructed the ethical values of duty and charity, and justice - as establishing social justice distributive justice, the justice as entitlement and as procedure, we realized their translation into contemporary practice of social services by ethical principles. Thus, following the approach of Frederic Reamer on social work in the context of ethical principlism, we identified those principles that influence social work practice.

We identified the principle of autonomy as a result of deconstruction in rational autonomy, and ontological freedom in in relational autonomy and self-determination. Also non-maleficence principle, along with that of beneficence could be understood as results of deconstruction of charity and dignity. Those principles of justice resulted from the deconstruction of value of justice, in the equity, procedure and righteousness.

Additionally the principlism developed by Beauchamp and Childress, we took the approach of Reamer principle of loyalty, which in our opinion was the result of deconstruction of faith that in the context of our work has been treated in the meaning of charity, which deconstructs the professionalization of social work under responsibility to the beneficiary and to the agency.

The second part of the paper - *Ethics Expertise* - treated the instances of ethics expertise development in relation to social practice. We debated the ethics expertise in considerations of ethical decision

models and tools. We identified how each constituent value is finding in the ethics expertise and can be based on supervision of ethics - as a model of ethics expertise.

Ethics expertise originated by philosophers, in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, is discussed in modern times, from an epistemic approach - characterized as cognitive ability, involving theoretical knowledge of the field - and a performative approach - which implies a possibility of excellence in the field.

We realized, starting from Weinstein, the distinction between performative and pragmatic approach to ethics expertise, showing that performing the action is to practice ethics in the conduct of the profession, while pragmatic approach to promoting ethics in professional practice in the relationship with the beneficiary. We have also emerged the ethics expertise from the utilitarian perspective or deontological perspective, as Moore argued for.

We synthesized the main theories of ethical decision and how they can be integrated into the construction of supervision of ethics, and a number of models of ethical decision, showing diverse applicability of these models in supervision of ethics of social practice.

In the context of ethics expertise, we have developed, starting from Reamer, a series of frames defining ethical audit, audit including two large dimensions, the one of reflecting to the current knowledge on the ethical domain, and the one of identification of the relevance of this knowledge in daily practice, identifying ethical risks and ethical decision making.

We concluded that the audit can overlap with supervision of ethics when are built strategies which come in helping the specialist to examine the practices based on ethics, in their own professional tasks. The difference between these two forms of ethics expertise, is identified in the methodology.

Ethics auditor shows the strengths and weaknesses of the organization in terms of implementing ethical practices, formulating in organization a number of proposals to improve the practice and operation, while the supervisor aims to develop the professional ethical practices, following identification of narrative strategies of moral meanings practitioner assigns its activities.

From our point of view the supervision of ethics from this perspective may represent a normalization of positions of power and discursive position of the professional to the client and to the organization.

In the argumentation of need for informed consent in the social practices we identified action research nature of social work, which in our opinion requires compliance with customer informed decision with regard to social intervention they receive.

Likewise we have shown the importance of the constitution of ethics committees at the level of providers of social services organizations, and not just at the level of organizations such as colleges of social workers. In this perspective we showed that at the professional organizations level, are discusses, based on minimalist ethics codes, professional conduct, related to malpractice. At the organizational level, ethics committees should be based on codes of ethics and on maximalist standards of ethical conduct desirability.

The main contribution aims the construction of the supervision model, a model of ethics expertise to be applied successfully in social services.

We highlighted in the thesis the delimitation of two conceptual areas, namely supervision of ethics and ethical supervision. First is aimed at ethical practices in terms of compliance with values and constitutive principles, respectively operational, which are particular to the organization. The second conceptual area, the ethical supervision is present in professional supervision, which is itself a major ethical component.

The perspectives of supervision of ethics construction focused on epistemic and pragmatic component. From the epistemic perspective, we highlighted the possibility of supervision as communicative action, and from the pragmatic point of view we pointed that supervision of ethics aims at the support to professionals in improving performance in implementing ethics, motivating the development of an organizational environment centered on ethical values.

We understand that supervision of ethics may perform the following functions: gatekeeping of ethical policies; the construction of ethics in organizations; the mediation in achieving a balance reflected in the organization over the interests of each party; ethical

compliance monitoring; ethical counseling, support and consulting; administratively - deliberative.

We have identified a number of significations for the concept of supervision of ethics. We also identified a number of contexts in which the achievement of supervision of ethics for the social services can build a social practice closer to the values constituting the welfare professions, and whose ethical foundation is brought into the practitioners' consciousness. We have not focused on possible ethical issues in the welfare system, preferring to show the importance of ethics expertise and supervision of ethics, to obtain a good existential condition for customers.

We were able to partially identify a number of theoretical contexts belonging to contemporary philosophical paradigms, such as communicative action theory, philosophical and counseling practice, ethical decision models etc. We realized with the development of the subject its complexity and his need to restrict the analysis to several theoretical models that can build such a discursive practice. The complexity of the addressed issues required limiting us to a number of theoretical models that can be used in the construction of supervision of ethics.