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**Dissertation
Great peace impossible. Eternal clashes under
different hegemonies
- abstract -**

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In the present work, “Great peace impossible. Eternal clashes under different hegemonies”, we have tried to combine two fields of view, political philosophy and international relations, to bring together the theoretical and the practical analysis of interesting situations arising from the globalizing society, whose witnesses we are and who took us more or less on guard. Perhaps the philosopher's role is more to ask questions, to try to combine the rationality and the method, deciphering meanings of draconian concepts, but also the natural disposition of the people, in an attempt to establish at least in theory, the best of all possible worlds. The other, the analyst of international relations can serve to analyze and predict, based on historical experience and philosophical framework founded by both classical and modern thinkers, and to correctly indicate some slippage occurred in the organization of society and explain the opinion public relations occurring between different groups of states or international institutions. Of course, both one and the other of personality types listed above will have a big problem, even if they find an ideal solution for all the problems of humanity. They will always face the decider - the power-hungry politician, almost always willing to sacrifice the solutions for the sake of its own stability. There is no criticism against him: after all, we must not have illusions, each social class has its purpose in a world which continues to function, to clutter, to develop. There is no reason to condemn the politician because he is too pragmatic, as from the perspective of international relations, it is useless to criticize philosophers for having brought more idealism, a dream note that it is impossible to translate into our daily practice. And the philosopher, in turn, should not rebel against waves of statistical and practical examples analyst likes to invoke in its analysis.

After all, for the good of society, it is best that these characters shake hands, going over specific disciplinary egos, cooperating in building a society for everybody, which will contain the ideas propagated by many areas of the social sciences. Within this framework of mutual respect we have chosen to conduct the present research, which is an attempt to address various current topics of global interest from various angles of process knowledge.

Thus, in a chapter we tried to revitalize the ideas of great thinkers, to ask their opinions about the latest happenings on the international scene, which many of them have not got to live. We wanted to see the horror or, as the case may be, approval in the face of the escalating conflict, the wars, the motivations which would support their opinions. Of course, this exercise has not been an entirely imaginary one, because we know philosophers very well through what they have written, a priceless heritage of humanity, that we could use more often. We have to admit, we went on the road seeking for peace. We thought it is close and tangible, considering that only some leaders drive us away from it by aberrant, irresponsible, superficial, motivation-lacking decisions. But maybe we were wrong. Let us see what we sought, which was the starting point, the assumption of our work that we wanted to check out. We started from the premise that conflicts between states can have a religious basis, as foreseen the American scholar Samuel Huntington. Especially after the events of September 11th 2011, the world has relied pretty much on the conflict between religions. Perhaps a bit too much, fact which was favorable to some, because they succeed in distracting the public attention from certain interests the great powers always manifest in some hot spots around the globe. We wondered, therefore, what would be the roots of conflicts, if religion can be among

them, unless it is the sole generator of misunderstandings between civilizations. Huntington has drowned out the optimism of Fukuyama, according to which we would expect a joyous end of history. We tried to figure out whether, within the Christianity, Orthodoxy was, due to its apparent passivity, a regression that caused a rift in the European civilization, which may generate new conflicts in the region. Then, we have focused on the vision that Westerners have against Islam and its expansion, often distorted, charged by a diffuse fear, even as the West's economy shine as a beacon in the desert. If the confrontation between religions is not the only cause of conflict, we must go further, investigating the desire for power that States have, especially the major powers. But an interesting discovery is based on the fact that there is nothing abnormal that powerful States want to obtain benefits in other territories, often far away from the natural boundaries. Imperial style of conquest, the combination of hard and soft power can represent not a whim but a necessity in the international system, which cannot remain in a power vacuum.

In our research we focused on the analysis of what is a rapidly changing phenomena, the challenge of modernity, namely the opening of national identity to the global world. How well will resist the traditions, ancestral habits in the face of internationalization, economic and social interdependences, which is the new reality of the international system, is the try which scares the Conservatives and stimulates the imagination of explorers. Immigrants have seen globalization as a chance of starting a new life, leaving deserted and de-industrialized areas, in the hope of finding new opportunities. But the natives feel startled by this influx of cheap, adaptable working hand that could compete on their increasingly fewer and more

poorly paid jobs .But the nation-state, although obviously in distress, especially in times of crisis, when the system seems to not work efficiently, it is not yet finished. We analyzed some institutional difficulties, present even in the rule of law. These include, for example, tyranny of the majority as the excess of parliamentarism. It makes sense, in a democratic society, the decisions to be taken by means of a majority, but the sensitive line appears when the majority turns out not responsible and what it promulgates comes into conflict with the very will of the people.

Another problem is exacerbating the nation-state nationalist feelings which may manifest patriotism beyond the intolerance, racism and xenophobia against those who are a minority. Patriotic momentum may prove disastrous if it reaches the wrong ways that promote hatred. A multi-cultural society is less exposed to nationalism than a state, because passions are dissipated, and an emphasis on collaboration is essential to maintaining the state, whereas, in a nation state, government failure lead to search culprits among ethnicities.

This brings us to the issue of legitimacy of the state to citizens; Leviathan can protect his subjects, but sometimes the monster turns his head on them if things go wrong. Unfortunately, often state proves itself unfair to its own citizens, favoring some at the expense of others. Social welfare models do not apply everywhere, and the differences between the rich and the poor tend to widen rather than to diminish. We then discussed the hypothesis of purity of democracy in a society based on the rule of law, based on the belief of many that a prolongeddemocratic exercise automatically guarantee a self-adjustingdemocracy. To what extent has this place and does not deviate in a skid is still a pertinent question that should not be excluded from any research. Because if we

start from the idea of a genuine democracy without reconsider and re-check it from time to time, we risk to talk about something that no longer exists. Western societies must regularly check their level of democracy as otherwise may not realize what is happening, by slipping on a slope where Leviathan shows his grin to his own subjects.

Further, with regard to the conflict of civilizations meeting on the background of globalization, we are trying to understand the differences with which different cultures perceive the phenomenon of colonialism. We wondered why for Westerners their approach was considered to be a spread of democratic and liberal values into the territories inhabited, according to Westerners, by barbarians who rejected the benefits of technological advances. But it was also necessary to enter into the role of these populations to feel our fundamentals destroyed by a storm of Western identity. These effects depend on the perception of the colonial model proposed by the two variants of globalization that we've addressed in this paper: soft and hard.

If the soft power would be preferable, as it is looked rattle of arms and artillery attacks, instead it would be more insinuating, imperceptibly undermining the culture and traditions of that community, not necessarily in a bad sense, but enough to change some mentality of the host society.

We drew attention to the differences in tone between state terrorism and the terrorism of despair, a term proposed by an Israeli analyst, by which it is designated the individual hopelessness, which sees religious fundamentalism as the only possible solution and salvation for the Afterworld. Without trying to justify their approach, we must however understand that the injustice of the

present society may give rise to such paradoxical reactions, which we must not underestimate, but try to understand them and, if necessary, to revise certain attitudes we are having.

We tried in a case study to look at the two approaches of modern geopolitics, comparing the style of the unique global superpower - the U.S. - with the reaction of Iran under the conservative presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. An assumption which we tried to test during the work was linked to the current melting of boundaries, even at a symbolic level, in what would be called global state, be it physical or virtual. Global state is based on the expansion of the Internet to all corners of the world. If it will be absolutely free communication, the establishment of a new global public space or will degenerate into a digital dictatorship without possibility of escape is what I tried to analyze, as a consequence of accelerated globalization. Will the revolutions still be possible, under the new conditions? Is the state, as we know it today, a guarantee of the stability of the social contract? Citizens are protected by the state against external danger, but who can defend them of an Almighty State? These were some of the research questions on which we focused. All these problems make possible the existence of conflicts or their flowering far easier than helping to create a stable peace.

The same goes with the Empires and their influence on the history. We started from the assumption that maybe they are responsible for the existing imbalances. But empires are as old as the world and this would mean that peace will always continue to be impossible. By what right can one compel a world power to assume tasks related to human welfare or justice? We were looking to see if it is thus incumbent on the great powers to supervise the proper

conduct of democratic institutions and values. Maybe our expectations are distorted by the media discourse, we place our hopes too high in certain societies, to guide us on certain roads. Their interests may differ from ours... We also wanted to talk about the opportunity to equip states with weapons of mass destruction, to ensure a balance and to discourage mutual nuclear tests among antagonistic actors. We would get a kind of icy peace, but perhaps this would be preferable to a scorching war.

In the course of the history have been looking for solutions to establish a balance between the need for a war and respect at the same time of peace, or rather between limitation of conflicts and extension of peaceful periods. Our initiative could not be, evidently, one exhaustive. We're going to surprise some considerations which the contemporary philosopher Michael Walzer proposes in an attempt to capture the difference between fair and unfair wars. He wonders if there may be a moral reality in a war. If there is not, it follows from this that the war may not be right. According to Walzer, since there is no universal criterion of Justice, it is risky to formulate a definition of war. However, he believes that it is important to establish the limits of armed action. How should the wars be, in order to be as correct as possible, if not fair? They must take care to reduce the use of violence and coercion towards non-combat, civil populations. There are two types of important limitations, says Walzer. The first one aims to establish the end of the war, targets struggling combat forces. The theory of just war aims at restoring the status quo before the assault, eliminating the potential danger that the aggressor used to previously have. And here we must stop, warns the philosopher, the mission is over once performed partial demobilization and disarmament of the armed forces of the aggressor. But we

can not go any further, excluding domestic political transformation aggressor state or regime change.

The second limit is the conduct of war, or how armed forces engage in their daily action. How we carry the war? It is necessary to attack by air, naval or land? Which way produces the lowest damage to non-combat population? But Walzer shows that it is not impossible to think of a perfect peace, which would be not only a messianic dream. But with an opinion which seems surprising, philosopher denounces a global authority that would claim a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, because it would pose a threat equal to that of an imperialist state. He proposes that, instead of having the United Nations to authorize states to use force without them actually use it in itself (as often happened due to vetoes cast by the great powers), this organization impartially condemn any attempt of aggression. In fact it has not happened so as Members judged aggression according to their different interests; for them it matters more who did it and what the results are, rather than entirely condemning any aggressive action, wherever that comes from. Limitation of conflict has apparently its limits, all dictated by reasons of state, in the purest realistic meaning.

We managed to identify some key elements of a coherent peace-war report, but in all this must not deprive political will as normal, democratic manifestation of the society's position in relation to these stringent problems of any socio-political organization. But some could argue even here: why should everyone suffer hunger by dividing to everyone a portion that becomes increasingly less (due to demographic growth and the decrease in resources), instead of the strong ones, according to natural law, to take as much possession of it, in order to ensure a smooth survival? Of course, we say that to encourage such an

approach is not a normal thing. However, in the face of a global food shortage, what state of affairs may be considered normal?

Why wouldn't such a war be useful to a community that would gain an advantage over the other? After all, state reason must work in support of the members of that community, they are the ones who gain more than the representatives of other communities. Everywhere there is adversity, whether they evince easily between members of society, this will be much more obvious in the case of those from outside. We do not seek to excuse and legitimize irresponsible behavior by some international actors that undermine global peace everyday, just try to understand the context that makes them do so. Drills of morality are more of a theoretical approach, unfortunately always remained garrisoned in the impossibility of a practical achievements. It was more an attempt by various philosophers, geographers of the phenomenon, to sow some rules where these seemed not to exist. To the extent, however, the twentieth century brought the death toll in wars at odds hitherto unimagined; it remains to question, however, whether centuries of exercising reason proved really useful or remained virtually un-echoed in the behavior of political/militarily decision makers. Of course, we don't deny the importance that all these philosophers gave a formulation of concepts that remain valid today, at least in terms of theoretical concept. The rest, it seems, has not depended and will not depend on them, but by the deciding forces that would be able to cast us in whirlpool wars or towards the coast of a somehow quieter misleading peace.

How current the Huntingtonian paradigm remains, despite its various critics, largely justified? We can, I think,

drawn with sufficient certainty some appreciation, which we will mention here:

-it will largely depends on West itself how much inflamed the situation will be in the coming years within the line of the main world civilizations; the West will try to assert ignored the rule, the resistance that i will oppose it will be bigger and more violent; if West will try to actively pursuit its domination, the more resistance will be met on the way;

-religion was, until Huntington, a phenomenon less analyzed in its international implications, by aspects of the potentiality collision and passionate outbursts that can lead to major conflicts; currently, it can no longer be overlooked, but the guilt should not be automatically assigned to a religion or another, carelessly or biased analyzed;

-Huntingtonian thesis appeared as a warning against too optimistic theories of a perpetual peace, made by the combination of political and economic democracy-free market. These short-lived hopes would crumble by its very lack of democracy, that version would not allow another form of economic or political organization. Fortunately, however, the world has not been radicalized to such an extent that it can no longer afford another choice. Thus, competition continues to exist. Hence the timeliness of the formula of Samuel Huntington, who has found a strong echo due to the existence of a n expansionary and controversial US foreign policy;

- this theory has its less good parts, sinning through a sometimes obvious and superficial crowding of the civilisations into much general patterns, defying shading notable exceptions that may occur. But it has the undeniable merit of opening an approach to international relations

- Another interesting question is how these conflicts will look like in the future? It is noteworthy that the production of increasingly sophisticated weapons, with huge possibilities of destruction, overshadowed with enough determination the thirst for wars of political and military leaders.

In ancient times, when military force was considerably lower and melee combat was the custom, conflicts quickly reach climax and bellicose statements were often immediately put into practice. Today, while a drone can kill absolutely anyone, and the possibility of 'collateral damage' has gradually increased, policymakers seem to think twice before triggering hell;

The question is: would anyone really want peace? Or, in the desire to show off as a global, continental or even regional power, any State is happy to trigger some strength exercises that may very well go from mere declarations to grand military parades and, later, some 'reasons' for war. How did a state show its supremacy, if not conducting an impressive military force? Being economic power does not guarantee global power status. Japan is a major economic power, but it is not part of the United Nations Security Council. To be there, what matters more is to possess military capabilities that can generate international influences. Germany is the great economic power of the European Union, somehow an "engine". But in military terms, Germany is far from being a great power.

Combining the ideas noted above, we may risk an answer to these questions: peace is not desired as state of affairs (to give just one example - by invoking various reasons powers retain a vast arsenal of weapons, boasting the others with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that they don't make strenuous efforts to destroy), but rather it is more a kind of truce, a provisional

state which saves time. If Count von Clausewitz said that peace is 'continuation of war by other means', we can say today that peace is a state of preparation for a new conflict. Why conflict and not war? And by this, we answer to the other question too. It is precisely because the devastating weapons of our century make possible even the destruction of the planet so if several States shall have access to such technologies, it follows from this that we are entering into an era that will 'freeze' - to a large extent - conflicts, the very rule of balance during the cold war. There will be a zero-sum game, in which case in a war no one will gain anything, but we will all lose enormously. But the idea of potential war will still be used, even to give the leaders a chance to internally legitimize a particular attitude. For them, it is essential for people to live with the consciousness of a foe, even an imaginary one. As more imaginary is this enemy, it receives 'fantastic' features, creating mystery and mythology for the common thinking. Then, as indicated by Desmond Morris in his studies, the tribe is more united in the moment when it is assailed by external enemies. At this point in life, we realize that the leaders want to hold the population unified around them and their actions, to legitimize and keep under control the possible dissidents. When you are in danger of an external threat as scary as it becomes, you are starting to rather think how to avoid it and less about its true nature. At least we know each other, We and the Others, the more likely it is to disproportionately see the danger where there is none.

Even if the future will keep us far from a classic war because it will involve high material and human costs, there is always the possibility to live again, at the psychological level, with a fear-induced or self-induced - of conflict with each other. This type of conflict, rooted in our humanity, speculated by rulers throughout history,

propagated over the centuries, remains unchanging variable of the international relations. Thus, we propose to give up the alleged civilizations clash, loaded with various types of voltage - of which religion is the most heavily regarded as the cause of collisions, even more than ideological clashes - identifying as the main source of conflicts the battles for controlling the natural resources and global domination by hegemonic states.

We intended to debate the current situation of the nation state, placed in front of a deep reorganization both at the institutional and the management of natural and human resources level in order to cope with the new challenges of the contemporary world, represented by the unprecedented development of globalization. This, as well as ocean waves, digs deep inside the structures of society, generating opportunities for knowledge and opening, but also concerns related to the structures within the framework of which we will be organized in the near future. The traditionally, westfalic State lives a difficult age, seeming to breathe more and more slowly in meeting the new problems related to population growth, disassembly of workplaces, wage decreases, complex measures of austerity budgets, financial insecurity etc. Our question is not necessarily about the desirability of globalization, as it appears today as an inevitable process linked to modernity and technological progress, but also the opportunity to preserve as much as possible the State as it is, even if the structure of citizens as part of the state will change considerably. In other words, it is possible and desirable to preserve a strong state, as possibly multi-ethnic requiring almost total sovereignty from the outside, from outer and beyond the classical social contract?

We saw that history can separate sister states by militarized borders (for example, the two Korean republics). They survived as a separate nation-states, because the homogeneity of their populations. Instead, when we want to build a multicultural State, problems of accentuated differences among citizens arises progressively. Only those States which will adopt the successful economic models that will raise the standard of living and will zoom in as much the income of individuals, erasing if possible the poverty line, will be able to accommodate in their boundaries a multitude of cultures and religions.

Regarding the thorny paths that the nation state has fully met in its establishment, the primary American and European models have been considered, showing clearly that they are almost impossible to be compared because the single language (English) as the main binder on the North American continent is an insufficient condition in a multilingual Europe.

In this paper we assumed as self-evident that strong and normal nation-states are those in which democracy and the rule of law prevail. We are concerned, however, of especially situations where these conditions are not fulfilled, because this way we can more easily analyze the impact of globalization. Difference between democracy, human rights, discursive theories and their practical application becomes sometimes considerable even in older democracies, as we notice especially in the case of how authorities responded at the anti-austerity rallies. Thus, it becomes imperative to analyze the institutional difficulties which the state encounters in the process of globalization.

Nationalism is not only a normal patriotic enthusiasm. He turns, fueled by pressure from economic, political, social hardship, into the bloody beast that crossed the

entire twentieth century. Nationalism becomes a desperate response of the citizens invaded by foreigners that they can no longer support. Just like terrorism, that is, internationally, a response to the colonial and neo-colonial tendencies of the global financial and military elite. The State has the duty to ensure justice and equity. When these are violated, and discrimination makes its way, the state loses all legitimacy. There are many liberals who would rush to dismembering the state, as it would allow market free hand. But how many people would be pleased by a complete disappearance of the state?

The democracy is never built forever. It's not enough to say that you have a democratic experience of 200 years or 1000 years and fall asleep under the illusion of democracy. Or to say that a functional democracy is self-regulating. This is likely to be suppressed anytime by otherwise normal phenomena of any society, such as the tyranny of the majority. On behalf of the majority profoundly anti-democratic events may take place. Separation of powers in a State with a chance to complete each other, plus an independence of justice may increase the chances of a genuine democracy.

We were previously mentioning the faces of globalization. This process is perceived differently, depending on the impact that the globalization has and the perspective from which it is viewed. For the colonial powers, first that triggered a kind of globalization - we can call it primitive - this meant civilizing peoples that were still in a barbarian stage, lacking the progress of Western culture. On the contrary, for those native people what remained after the invaders were more blood, destruction, pain. Also, an important difference is created by the form taken by the globalization through its exercise of power - the hard and soft functions. No matter how insinuating, the

latter is still preferable. The exercise of militarized power as pillar of globalization turns those whose lives are actually destroyed into potential terrorists. These, although often associated with weak States membership (non-performing loans, undemocratic, etc.) find their dwelling place in old democracies, where, in response to the terrorism of the State (a form of abject and hypocritical mixing of a brazen nationalism with a victimized rhetoric, such as the preventive war), launch their own variant of terrorism.

In the global world, whoowns the resources has the power. Struggles for influence can be clearly seen in the geopolitical game worn in recent years between the U.S. - high power of global vocation and Iran - Muslim republic that wants to be a powerful regional leader, willing to destroy 'the arrogance of the Western powers.' If not somehow worse, history will continue to provide this eternal chess between the two powers with different views on the global geopolitical game. We have established that a relevant avatar and perhaps the most important one of globalization is the virtual network called Internet. But this is a double-edged weapon, only the future being able to determine which will be the look and by whom it will be controlled. On the one hand, the Internet provides us with the possibility of communication, at an unprecedented scale so far, but it also provides us with the specter of a Big Brother that will control us permanently, even beyond the borders of our State, making any uprising virtually impossible. Monitoring of communications, messaging services, users will take place on a global scale, with no possibility of escape into another space. Is not it better to encourage the existence of a state, whatever it may be, always deceiving us with the possibility of transmutation, an escape to other lands, than living a life of global

dictatorship from which there is no escape whatsoever? If globalization would succeed in soft mode, without assistance of a brutal aggressive imperialism, then we might have the ability to live under less pressure, in a more peaceful way with ourselves and with the otherness, under the waves of globalization, with all the benefits and fears which it produces.

From those discussed here it results that, although at first glance things did not look great for the American world supremacy, however the situation is presented as balanced, because not even a big power is exempt from its internal problems, which today, in a time of crisis, should be handled with priority, leaving the external confrontations more in the background. However, this does not mean that world peace will be clearly established. Conflicts will still smolder, their deployment will only be temporarily delayed, without being definitively resolved. What is lacking to the peace is an universal will for peace. As long as influential global leaders do not actually put the problem of peace, but rather see it as a break to later resume the disputes, we are still far from getting rid of eternal clashes.

Current empires struggle to maximize or, at best, to maintain their power. If a conflict helps this goal, they will not hesitate to initiate it. The balance of power is still thought in realistic terms of state reason. There is no global sense, designed for the good of all. International institutions should deal with it, but unfortunately they are still subordinate to the individual interests of the member states.

We have tried during the investigation, to verify some assumptions proposed by the speedy globalization of the last decades. Of course, we can never give a definitive judgment on such a phenomenon, as many perspectives

from which it can be seen make any labeling superficial. Nothing is simple, we all we may be wrong, and not only once, during a lifetime; it is important to try to be honest with what we think, while letting open gates for various other interpretations that, as well as ours, may be correct or wrong. If they have been carried out in good faith and honesty, we don't think they can be blamed.

We have started with the hope of finding a close, palpable peace, driven away by some dark, greedy or ignorant, war thirsty minds. But we've found out that since an early stage of traceable history there have been many people who have been looking for the very same thing. They were, among others, philosophers who, through reason, have tried to explain the causes, nature, dilemmas or the justification of wars, if they are ethical, moral, and so on. The conclusions we have emerged from their teachings are not new, it is probably close to what each of us believes that war should look like (when it is unavoidable). First, the attack on its own is still a crime. Wars, in case it could not be otherwise, should be only for defense and governed by rules, which all the parties have to respect. Philosophers, with few exceptions, have not encouraged warlike activity, but realized that, to be avoided, it is necessary, in addition to the consent of all belligerents, the establishment of a higher institutional level. In practice, however, though after the World War I, the League of Nations was created, whose purpose was to avoid a repeat of the horrors of the great war thus far, this has not received the support of many major countries, including the U.S., thus becoming powerless in the outbreak of the WW II. This, more fierce than the first one in terms of human and material losses, put again the major decision-makers in position to reassert the constitutional principles of the League of Nations by creating a new

multinational structures, the UN. This, though still functional after more than half-century from its appearance and so far avoiding a World War III, still proves to lack the power to insure the long-awaited peace. The famous resolution 181 of 1947, which granted the Palestinians the right to have a State, was not implemented until today, it remained just a decision which generated further inflammation of spirits.

How to restrict the conflict, we wondered, if all peace is doomed to failure? It remains to give up the illusion of peace and think pragmatically of a limited conflict? It seems that this is the solution proposed by Walzer, who somehow summarizes and updates the concerns of philosophers to reduce the scourge of armed conflict. There is a need for an institution to condemn not only the conflicts triggered by certain States, but by any State, according to some strict rules, applicable to all equally. Then, even in case of conflict, the abuser must be disarmed and its armed capacity reduced to the stage where they become harmless, but it won't be tried an internal political transformation of that State, since that change must normally come from within, and not imposed by a foreign force of the concerned.

Political decisions, express by political leaders' will, is ultimately the decisive factor in triggering potential conflicts. As long as it will be foreign of man's wisdom, and of the unheard will of people it is impossible to think that peace will ever leave the drama scene in order to receive the well-deserved eternal rest. But such kantian hopes cannot flourish in the presence of perpetual disagreement with the Otherness, be it for jobs or because of the belief in the superiority of one system over a less happier one.

Thus, addressing the issue from the grim Huntingtonian predictions, that the wars of the future will be civilizational and will be situated on the fault lines that separate civilizations with different religions we think, as S. Huntington, that it will largely be the responsibility of the West to manage these potential conflicts in a peaceful way. If it will want to impose at any price its alleged cultural supremacy, then it will bump into a strong resistance which would not succumb without a fight. Binomial theorem - free market and democracy - should not be confused with the universal peace, even if we are witnessing a clear success at the moment, however far from being fulfilled. More importantly, there is a need to understand that, even if it happens, we cannot expect an eternal happiness, since such an universal option would leave no room for alternative. Same, an overall success of socialist Marxism would not constitute heaven on earth, if it would represent the only way of life.

Religion, which until its reaffirmation by Samuel Huntington was not the main concern of researchers analysts, not being much correlated with the political phenomenon or the manifestation of violent and extremist attitudes, meanwhile became a possible partial explanation of certain terrorist movements; we however draw the attention to the danger of generalizing religion as a disruptive factor, and generator of open conflicts. Demography, economic crisis, increase poverty, lack of jobs, social inadequacy, insufficient integration into the host communities (immigrants' case), all these are sufficient reasons to explain the radicalization of some young people, pointing to all sorts of fundamentalism (Judaic, Christian, Muslim).

Of course, Huntington introduced civilizations maybe in a too schematic way, like a pre-global geopolitic,

disregarding the homogeneity of the past decades. Therefore we must look with some margin of error at such imminent war between civilizations, seeking its causes not in the clash of religions or cultures, but rather in the different interests of states in expansion, ie global hegemony. On the other hand, the technological weapons development that have passed from the axe era to the invisible drone has generated an effect that one should call positive - if this wouldn't sound too cynical.

Policy makers reflect today more than before the outbreak of war, because the number of victims – despite all the promises about the 'intelligent' weapons which avoid civilian targets -grows exponentially with each day of war. Optics created around the concept of war seems however to discourage its practical application. However, as M. Walzer observed, some states are discouraged from practicing war, while others announce that it is a matter of survival of the community, which feels threatened by various external threats. We have put this question: If the will for peace is supported or it is invoked merely as an impossibility due to some enemies of the system seen as scapegoats, in other words those who will always be used to justify governance failures. Peace has remained an intermediate state which is a pause, often used to solidify a defense. As the ancients used these periods to raise ramparts and fortify cities, today we are buying time to seek further compensations, allies for defense (or attack) etc.. Any strong state calls sometimes to such exercises of power, to show strength. This is how the U.S. leadership wanted to be the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately for them, that's where they got stuck in a guerrilla war, which still continues today. Of course, democratization is not necessarily the target of those countries oppressed by dictators and military interventions,

but to maintain control over resource-rich regions. It is understood that their total annihilation, if it would be possible, would not bring any strategic advantage to the attackers, they still remain without a justification for their military presence in those territories. Of course, civilians are the ones who feel most strongly the double danger, caused by the constant uncertainty of possible attacks by guerrilla soldiers and the disadvantages of a foreign military occupation, no matter how democratic they claim it is. As we found in the research, the enemy, real or imagined by propaganda must necessarily be kept alive as long as it will be useful for the political power. Then, if he no longer serves the purposes he may be eliminated in some subtle. We can mention here the fate of famous foe named Bin Laden, who did not have an official trial in which all the crimes he committed to be proven.

In any case, the war will not disappear completely from the stage of history, because sometimes it even serves as a threat, a potential conflict always serving certain interests. We hope, however, that future decision makers have assimilated the lesson of the twentieth century and the frozen terror of nuclear weapons and they will reflect more deeply before switching to radical action. From religions and civilizations we must, however, move the explanation of the war phenomenon on the interests for natural resources, arranged so tragically uneven throughout the world. Hegemon States, these resource-hungry states, never cease to look to new territories, ruled by others.

But, for the first time in human history, the whisper of globalization entered the stage as a morning dew, corroding the very inner structure of the states. The free market has begun to undermine old areas in which the state was sovereign. Even the monopoly use of force is no

longer in a decisive percentage the state privilege, this is sometimes observed in the haste with which some are investing in the military or in a war, under the pressure of large weapon companies. The current economic crisis, caused less by the social welfare state model (proof that the pure system of the welfare state, Norway remained outside the major crisis), as the banking sector (ie non-State) gave an opportunity for states to show their strength which many believed lost, managing to invest in maintaining the system life, but not permanently closing the debate on the future of the nation state. The state is forced to reorganize itself and especially to produce less discrimination between the native population and the immigrants. One of our research questions referred to the desirability of having a strong, multi-ethnic state, keeping its sovereignty within and unwilling to give it up to external institutions or other international bodies. If the state will widen the gap between the incomes of rich and the already too contested aid to the poorest, then we do not believe in the stability of the fundamental institution. Most likely, as is logical, a strong state will try to maintain a balance of incomes among the citizens. Keeping under control the social grievances, State leaders can hope for adhesion of citizens to their projects. Instead, a divided state is a weak State, vulnerable both to internal strife and external infiltrations. In addition, a democracy does not stay uncrackable for decades or centuries, just because it was democratized at 1789 or 1848. Collective political actors must not be satisfied with the idea of democracy alone, but also to try applying it and ensuring continuously its availability, because there is no need for many shortcomings to kill a democratic society. It is obvious today by how they deal with strikers, protesters, immigrants or even their own nationals, in areas withhold

democratic traditions. Control of the individuals in the virtual environment, limitation of free speech, praising the own culture at the expense of the other are not at all manifestations of a genuine democracy. Exacerbated nationalism and hatred towards the Otherness can lead to a massive mess ending in open conflict. However, as with social unrest, nationalism can be dangerous in an unstable, poor, unjust, inegalitarian society, where scapegoats responsible for failures can be found more easily. Libertarians have undermined the state, subordinating him to the free market and dreaming of a world of powerless states. For the time being, the classic state has not yet disappeared, confrontations are maintained inside the traditional conflict areas. We analyzed in the paper the eternal chess between the U.S. and the regional power which opposes it in the Middle East, Iran. They represent two different ways of seeing the geopolitical phenomenon and to tackle globalisation. We don't think there will be a war there in the near future, even if Iran is strongly opposing to the American presence. Iran is seeking to restore the balance of power by creating some advances weapons. But the fastest globalizing tool is nowadays the Internet. A double-edged weapon, angel or demon, the Internet will leave us float in an illusion of freedom, or it will throw us in a complete despair due to the lack escape, in a totally controlled world, where even the utopias will become a pale memory, uncertain of their very existence. Such a society would make impossible any form of revolt, any attempt at change. Already authentic revolutions seem increasingly harder to be performed. It seems that the soft power mode is the only one which could reduce fear of globalization. This way, both pressure and human fears, anxieties can be diminished by discovering more pleasant things. As long as we do not see tanks in the streets, one

can feel optimistic, happy with the stability of one's universe.

We have discussed that the global supremacy is usually controlled by the hegemonic powers, different from one era to another. Today West has become a kind of ancient Roman Empire and, just like the latter, knows pronounced signs of decline. On one hand, this is due to territorial expansion, far beyond the possibilities. On the other, the arrogance of conquerors of the so-called barbarian space. The West has thought and still thinks, despite all evidence provided, that everything is allowed. The opposition is discredited, on the grounds that it does not act in accordance with democratic principles. We are witnessing to a sort of a strange dictatorship of democracy, in which any other system is completely rejected as impractical. The fact that the decision makers do not think about alternatives is likely to worry, as the contemporary economic crisis will increase, and the lack of other variants of systemic organization has a gift to create panic and fatalism.

The common tendency is to blame the empires, these global hegemonies, for having ruined the peace. But it is not exactly true because, willy nilly, a superior force apparently is still designed to ensure the international system and to avoid the power vacuum that would lead to a systemic anarchy. And the imperial behavior seems to be not an exception but the rule. We were wrong, as we expected that the world will change in a better way, while listening mobilizing speeches about the universal rights, democracy and the free market. We forgot that this kind of discourses are either to keep us calm, or contrarily, to darken our spirits.

The hypothesis that circulated within our research was linked to the question of whether the conflicts are

recurring throughout history, or not. Judging from a historical point of view, they seem unavoidable, related to the deep evolutionary process. The empires, throughout the process, took the place as rulers of the world. We saw that big hegemonic empires always existed. There were authors who put flammable conflict behaviors precisely on account of these entities in the international arena. But before setting up such forms of human organization, individuals have experienced forms of conflict, both mild and severe. To paraphrase Hobbes or Hegel, we can say that the history of all societies until today is the history of the conflict. A history of the peace cannot be written because we would already talk about literature of Utopia, peace being a deep sigh, felt and heard after the sounds of war go silence in reality but not in memory. From memory it is harder to disappear, because the policy-makers don't often let people time to breathe and to forget about the war, as the 20th century successfully proved, unfortunately. Otherwise, peace has grown basically among the graves, the daughter of terror and the concessions, born rather from fear of destruction than from the real desire of coexistence in good understanding.

Another conclusion would be the finding that September 11, 2001 changed the world, but not necessarily in a positive or desirable direction but, unfortunately, it paved the way for power in democratic states. Terrorists who, according to the official discourse, sought to change the Western way of life, to shake confidence in the organization and in our democratic institutions, even managed to fulfill their mission, helped - paradoxically - by their enemies who perpetuate fear and the theme of terrorism to justify many of their decisions and actions.

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