

ALEXANDER THE GREAT. FROM PELLA TO PERSEPOLIS (336 – 330 BC)

SUMMARY

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INTRODUCTION

The first six years of Alexander's reign from his succession to the throne till Darius III's funeral is without a doubt an outstanding, well-defined period within the historical background created by the Great Macedonian.

Highlighted by a few essential moments, which in turn generated distinctive stages, the period has an inner unity and its own dynamics. Consequently, the whole sequence of events to follow till 323 BC could be thus explained. When he started his Asian expedition, Alexander had not even dreamed of the vast empire he was going to establish.

The year 330 BC represents a crucial moment in the development of the subsequent events; it is the year when Darius III is definitively defeated, the year when Alexander's position consolidated, and the year when the projects of the Macedonian king mark other targets, the year when the huge transformation will take place in Alexander's mind. The aim of my thesis is to present "the cornered" Alexander the Great, exposed to great risks and forced to cope with limit situations. The manner he succeeded in managing these crisis situations won him his greatness.

I The Beginning of Alexander the Great's Reign

1.1 The Nature of the Macedonian Monarchy

Alexander the Great's reign has been a subject that intrigued countless readers, and, it is not surprising that this interest in the historical character of the Macedonian king has stimulated their imagination and created a rush of biographies.¹

C. Bradford Wells pointed out that "there were more Alexanders". Alexander's crisis – Wells said – is more than a genuine historical one. It is, first of all, a psychological one ... Alexander's crisis can be compared to that of Jesus. The difficulty is to know what to believe"²

As far as Alexander's biographies are concerned, Wells mentions but a few: Berve's **statistical and documentary** Alexander³, Wilcken's **reasonable** Alexander⁴, Schachermeyr's **brutal** Alexander⁵, Tarn's **gentlemanly** Alexander, this latter one explaining all the negative evidence used as hostile propaganda manufactured by his enemies to mock his name.⁷

Alexander is a "**conqueror**", namely a **plunderer**, in R. Cohen's vision⁸, a strong visionary who wishes total, limitless conquest, for Radet⁹, or a desperate man confronting a series of problems which could have jeopardized not only his throne but also his life, for Wirth¹⁰.

Nowadays researchers have shown an interest in Alexander's approach to universalism. Did Alexander set out to conquer the whole world and create a universal empire? Did he have the proper circumstances for such a project?

The existing sources reveal little evidence, but it is sure that Alexander, regardless of his military skills and his genius – both of whom no one questions – couldn't have aimed so high, at least during the first years of his reign.

Indisputably, the first days of his reign must have been critical for Alexander¹¹, and the responsibilities withstood by the twenty-year-old king weren't easy either.

Taking into account the political institutions of Macedonia in the fourth century BC, the manner the throne

succession was going on, the brutality most of the Macedonian kings ended their reign from, the attitude of the neighbouring states towards the growing influence of Macedonia, the realities from the Greek world, the financial means which existed at the death of Philip II, we can draw on a possible answer regarding Alexander's endeavours at the beginning of his reign.

Macedonia's enormous growth in power after 359 BC turns its throne into a big prize, and brings more enemies for Macedonia who were willing to stop the kings' Phillip II and Alexander the Great expansion¹². Alexander's challenging mission was to sustain this state of affairs for Macedonia and even enhance it. However, in Plutarch's words, Alexander inherited a reign which brought along stubborn feuds and grim enemies from all over the place¹³,

Royal succession in Macedon was hereditary, male, patrilineal and generally respected the principle of primogeniture. However, there are some exceptions. Amyntas III (393-370 BC had six sons when he died. Three of whom he had with Gygaia (Archelaus, Arrhidaios and Menelaos, all born before 393 BC.) and three with Eurydice (Alexander, Perdikkas and Philip, out of whom only one was of full legal age in 370 BC)

The one who would take over the reign in the summer of 370 BC was Alexander (Alexander II, 370 – 368 BC) although he wasn't the eldest.

If the first born was a minor at the time of the king's death, the throne remained vacant until he was of age and his closest agnate, usually his uncle was named tutor or regent to the throne¹⁶.

There are cases when choosing a minor for the reign is possible, with the price of a dangerous and unsure regency, instead of the eldest son of the late king, available at the court. For instance, in the summer of 368 BC at the death of Alexander II (370 – 368 BC) the favourite is Perdikkas

(Perdiccas III 365 – 360) instead of Archelaus, the son of Amyntas III with Gygaia.¹⁷

There was also an elective element: when the king died, his designated heir, generally but not always the eldest son, had first to be accepted by the council (Synedrion) and then presented to the general Assembly to be acclaimed king and obtain the oath of fidelity.¹⁸

As can be seen, the succession was far from being automatic, more so considering that many Macedonian kings died violently, without having made dispositions for the succession, or having assured themselves that these would be respected.¹⁹

No fewer are the examples of the Macedonian kings who lost their lives in such conditions, throwing Macedonia in long- lasting periods of chaos and political instability²⁰.

Another important factor in the frequent succession crises in Macedonia was polygamy, which led to endless fights for the throne between possible pretenders. Throughout Macedonia's history from ancient times till the time of Alexander the Great, such practices as assassinations, adulteries, distant heirs, usurpers were frequent at the Pella court.

Trying to illustrate human society in ancient Macedonia, Waldemar Heckel²², presents the picture of some dogs eating each other. "Friends become agents of this or that homicide, as in the case of Kleandros who killed Parmenion from another friend's orders, Polydamas. Sons get rid of their fathers, nephews of their uncles, and brothers don't cooperate as well as expected."

Amyntas III, who reigned intermittently between 390 – 369 BC succeeded in stopping only temporarily internal disturbances²³, but after his death, Macedonia became within a few years a theatre for throne fights between pretenders²⁴ Archelaus I (419/ 413 – 399 BC) strengthens his authority assassinating his relatives who were disputing the throne²⁵. Philip II, Alexander the Great's father,

strengthened his kingdom causing the death of five members of the royal house²⁶, and Alexander II (370 – 368 BC) is killed from the orders of his mother Eurydice²⁷.

Succession crises were frequent, especially up to the 4th century BC, when the magnate families of Upper Macedonia still cultivated the ambition of overthrowing the Argead dynasty to ascend to the throne.

Consequently, the political institutions of Macedonia were informal and rudimentary²⁹, and the succession to the throne under the form of passing the power from father to son was the general principle which reminded the old customs. These could have shown the leadership ways in most of the cases, but the unwritten customs are not and cannot be coded articles of the laws which enforce solutions for all situations, even the most unusual and complicated ones³⁰.

In addition, any reign change needs time, for the one in power has a difficult job, in order to put order both within the country and outside it, and remove the political instability generated by the throne rivalries. However, there are no other explanations for the practice of assassinations at the Court except instability and the need of the person who orders these assassinations to strengthen his authority. Intrigues, dynastic conspiracies and assassinations represent important factors in periods of political instability.

Nothing could be farther from the truth in 336 BC when Philip II is killed. Demaratus Corinthian, Philip's guest, being asked by the Macedonian king about the Greek situation, "It ill becomes you," replied Demaratus, "to be so solicitous about Greece, when you have involved your own house in so many dissensions and calamities."

Philip's trying to improve his seven marriages had led to dreadful misunderstandings between him and his son Alexander, who could see his throne threatened. "But Philip's familial squabbles which brought about feud between him and Alexander were blamed on his son, and

what is worse because of Philip's love affairs and marriages together with the gynoecia his reign was suffering as well"³²

1.2. Alexander the Great's Enforcement on the Throne of Macedonia

Philip's death comes at an unfavorable moment for Alexander, considering the fact that all throne pretenders were subjects to a surge of terror.

Although the real reasons for the elimination of all unmanageable people are not sufficiently known, these actions highlight Alexander's insecurity and anxiety regarding his frail authority.

The old general Attalos, who was the uncle of his father's seventh wife Cleopatra, could not escape from his anger. Attalos would not acknowledge Alexander as an heir, considering him a bastard and unworthy of coming to the throne³³. The descendents of the royal house of Temenidae are also killed because, as sons of Aeropos, were according to tradition, members of the royal family of the Lyncestians, some of whom were the kings Aeropos III, Archelaus and Periccas II.³⁴

The three brothers, Arrhabeus, Heromenes and Alexander Lyncestes, seem to have been executed under the conviction of plotting against the king's life and reign, and at least one of them, if not all three of them, was murdered because he thought that he could claim the throne for himself³⁵.

The support given to the king by Alexander, Aeropos' son, in a difficult moment – a moment when the king was surrounded by countless enemies – delayed his execution³⁶. If it hadn't been for these reasons, Alexander's high status could not be explained – he was part of the king's suite and was in charge of the Thessalian cavalry. He would fall from grace after 330 BC, a moment when the

position of the Macedonian king strengthened, and the risk of his elimination was minimum. Darius and Agis III were dead, and the greatest battles had been won³⁷.

Being a minor at the death of his father Perdiccas III, Amyntas would stay at the Court, as a member of the royal house, during the reign of his uncle Philip II, obtaining high functions in the state and marrying Alexander's stepsister, Cynane. Once a major in 336 BC, at the time of Philip II's death, Amyntas is murdered by Alexander, being accused of the same thing, namely plot against the king³⁸.

The discovery of an inscription at Levadia, north of Boeotia where Amyntas is mentioned as the king of the Macedonians (I.G. VII 3055) determined some researchers to plead for dating the inscription after Philip's death, around 336 – 335 BC, and to consider this title as a claim of the throne by Amyntas³⁹.

The dating of the inscription is not an easy matter because it cannot be clearly stated if the visit to the Oracle of Trophonius took place during the stated period, or if we consider other sources, between 355 – 346 BC⁴⁰, between 359 – 357 BC⁴¹, or it is some simple artwork of the people of Levadia, or of their secretaries, wishing to have a famous name on top of their visitors' list.⁴²

One thing is for sure, whether or not he fancied taking over, Amyntas, Perdiccas' son, could have done it, considering his origins, which ultimately made him a real threat for the young king.

Furthermore, the same fate would await Alexander's brother, Caranos who could have disputed the throne.⁴³

It is unlikely that Alexander was supported by all Macedonians. The death of Philip in July 336 BC, meant for some of them a chance to change the politics promoted by him⁴⁴, and the fact that Alexander was likely to carry on his father's politics⁴⁵, wasn't exactly what they expected.

1.3.Philip II's Legacy

Philip ensured loyalty to the crown through a series of rewards and generous donations to the nobility. As a result, the nobility, obtaining a certain status at the Court and being rewarded, was diminished and diverse. These rewards implied financial interests and military obligations⁴⁶.

However, at the time of his coming to the throne, Alexander had only sixty talents at his disposal⁴⁷. Was this the means the young king set his mind on conquering the world with?

In a research concerning Alexander's financial problems, at the beginning of his reign (336 – 334 BC), François Rebuffat⁴⁸ shows that Alexander did not seem, at least at the beginning of his reign, a romantic hero, who urged by an unnamed "pathos" to engage in something beyond his means without reasoning.

II The Connections with the Greek World

2.1 The Challenges within the Greek World after the Death of Philip II

The news of Philip's death caused great anxiety in Greece. In Athens, the voice of Demosthenes urged the Greeks to disobedience towards the Macedonian king, who was even ridiculed because of his tender age at the time of his taking over the reign⁴⁹. The Thebans voted for the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison while there was a state of revolt in Peloponnesus, Argos, Elis and in the Arcadian League. There were disturbances in Western Greece, as well. The Aetoliens voted for sending back the exiled to Acarnania. In Ambracia, the Macedonian garrison was expelled⁵⁰.

2.2 Demosthenes and The Anti-Macedonian Party

The leader of the Anti-Macedonian Party which held the majority in Athens, Demosthenes, opposed Macedonia vehemently as much as possible, although he was cautious not to involve Athens in an open war⁵¹.

He “opposed mightily the growing supremacy of the Macedonians”⁵², both during the time of Philip II and after his death.

Demosthenes mocked the peace between fortresses promised by Philip and tried to make the Athenians aware of the perils posed by Macedonia.

Unable to enroll troops capable of sustaining an open fight with Philip, Demosthenes urged the Athenians to “an unexpected, plundering war as soon as possible”⁵³

The right circumstances were created in 336 BC at the time of Philip’s assassination. The killer of the Macedonian king, Pausanias, was going to be praised in Athens, Alexander to be mocked and Attalos, who was Alexander’s deadly enemy, was promised the support of the Athenians if he dared the newly settled king of Pella.

2.3 Alexander “hegemon” of a League of Allied States

The League of Corinth had probably been established after the defeat of the allied Greek forces at Chaeronea, in August 338 BC, the defeat that represented a huge disaster for Athens – 1000 deaths and approximately 2000 prisoners taken by Philip⁵⁴.

The majority of the peninsular Greek states, except Sparta which stated that it did not want to be ruled, but rule⁵⁵, joined the League of Corinth.

The purpose of the League of Corinth was to create an alliance⁵⁶ which hinted at reconciling all current hostilities between the Greek fortresses in order to start an offensive against “the barbarians” in Asia, “to revenge the ancient injustices carried out by Xerxes “⁵⁷ and it was officially announced by Philip in 337 BC.

The Pan-hellenic Crusade was to be fiction for everybody⁵⁸ but the interests of Macedonia demanded that the League of Corinth existed for the Greek situation to be under its control. The League of Corinth was nothing but a temporary solution to the political problems in Greece.⁵⁹

The relationships between Alexander and the Greeks weren't cordial, of course, but they did not stand for a comfortable ally for the Macedonian king.⁶⁰ The Greek situation represented quite a delicate problem for Alexander, which he never solved, not even at the end of the Asian expedition. The Macedonian king found himself in the position of adapting his attitude towards the Greeks according to the existing circumstances, this being the only solution to avoid a failure in all directions.

2.4 Outcomes of the Hegemonic Tendencies in the Greek World

Both Philip's assassination in 336 BC and the political crisis that followed in Macedonia gave Thebe the opportunity to return on the stage of history. The fact that Thebans dared to attack the Macedonian garrison in Cadmeia, put Alexander in a difficult position as long as this riot could also taint not only the Athenians whose attitude had been suspicious for Alexander for a long time, but also the Spartans, his old opponents, or other peoples in Peloponnesus.⁶¹

Aetolia, Boeotia, Athens, Elis, Argos and Arcadia concurred with Thebe and helped her even though they were members of the League of Corinth whose leader was Alexander himself⁶².

Alexander's situation was deteriorating and the alliance of Chaeronea had almost reconsolidated, jeopardizing the whole structure of the League of Corinth.

Later on Sparta would see a similar fate in 335 BC. This fortress, which sustained that Greek's hegemony was

traditionally hers, was much too weakened at the time of Philip's death to pretend any territory.⁶³

If the action of the Spartan king, Agis III, in collaboration with the Persians had been successful in 332 BC, it would have had disastrous consequences for Alexander and the Macedonian state. The moment was not chosen randomly because at the time Macedonia was suffering because of Alexander's repeated demands for enlisting since he was preparing a new confrontation with Darius III.

When the Spartan king Agis III started the war in Peloponnesus and besieged Megalopolis in the year 331/0 BC, Antipatros, Alexander's regent in Macedonia, hardly managed to mobilize an army. His forces rose up to 40 000 soldiers, but the vast majority were mercenaries of the Greek allied states, few of them being Macedonians⁶⁴. Although this action was defeated, it would give the Macedonian king a hard time before having to send Antipatros money to supply with paid mercenaries his forces in Macedonia⁶⁵.

2.5 Alexander, the Greeks and the Planning of the Asian Expedition

How much Alexander relied on the loyalty of the Greek can be inferred from the participation or better said absence of the allied troops from the great battles held by Alexander in Asia. These are especially mentioned as offensive or maneuver troops.⁶⁶

Although there was poor collaboration between Alexander and the League of Corinth, the Macedonian king is miming good relations between him and the Greek. It was the only option so as the Greek world, ready to explode anytime, would not prevent him from putting his plans into practice. In other words, the Greek peace was necessary for his Asian expedition.

III The Crossing of the Hellespont and the Defeat of Dareios III

3.1 The Objectives of the Conquests

The war started in 334 BC against the Persians meant solving Alexander's numerous problems: he would have solved both the economic situation of Greece and Macedonia, he would have acquired territories where the surplus of population from Hellada could have been settled down. In addition, the war against the Persians could have helped Alexander to strengthen his position which was in a crisis after the death of Philip II⁶⁷, he would have focused everybody's attention towards the war and thus distracting their attention from the events in Macedonia and bringing peace to the country.

The Macedonian king also understood that to solve Macedonia's security problems for good the Persian Empire as an independent force had to be destroyed⁶⁸ or, as an alternative, to either restrict the access of the Persians to Europe or to push them as far away as possible from the Macedonian borders.

3.2 Alexander's Situation at the Beginning of the Asian Expedition

If Alexander's situation had been difficult by the time of the Hellespont crossing, it became critical after attacking the Persian Empire. As he was advancing into the heart of the Empire, Alexander had to deal, on the one hand, with the burden of the war and the concerns and apprehensions related to the situation in Europe, on the other.

What is worse, catering was difficult because of the huge distance, soldiers were getting fewer and fewer

everyday because they either died or settled in the conquered territories, the battles were fought on unknown ground, and the financial resources could only last him 30 days. The constant need for troops to continue the expedition forced Alexander to take even greater risks, leaving Antipatros, the regent in charge of governing Macedonia in his absence, without enough troops necessary for the defending of the state in case of some “malfunctions” in Europe.

3.3 Changes Occurred in Alexander’s Position after the Victories of Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela

The Battle of Granicus put an end to Alexander’s financial concerns (we have as proof the regal gifts he would make starting from this date)⁶⁹ but his restfulness is yet to come. One single victory against Darius III – who was still at large, did not mean winning the war, while one single victory of the Persian king against Alexander would have meant a total disaster for the latter. This victory is especially important because it allowed the Macedonian king to continue the expedition. By continuing the expedition, he would expose himself to even greater risks. Darius had withdrawn east, challenging Alexander to advance into the heart of the empire. Unfortunately, Alexander could not risk chasing Darius, and together with the army he had to keep to the shores of the Mediterranean as much as possible. However, he would have to face the risk of being swept into the sea in the event of an attack from the Persian king.

The victory of Issus was more important than the one of Granicus because it opened Alexander’s way towards Phoenicia ,whom if he conquered he would deprive the Persians of the support of their fleet.⁷⁰ However, the victory of Issus saved Alexander from a possible disaster and had a tremendous importance for the prestige the

winner gained considering the fact that his army was considerable smaller than that of the Persian king and he also succeeded in capturing his wife and children and witnessed Darius's humiliating flee .⁷¹

The great king did not perceive the battle of Issus as a catastrophe. On the contrary, he only lost some territories temporarily to resume later the offensive more vigorously⁷².

After Issus, Alexander had obtained an ethno-territorial conglomerate, with few means of organizing it conveniently while Darius was still ruling over Bactria, Sogdiana, Parthia, Persia, Media, India, Scythia, namely an ethnically homogenous territory and an everlasting resource reservoir which ensured his rapid recovery⁷³.

After Gaugamela the odds were in Alexander's favour, but the victory was not final.⁷⁴ Defeated at Gaugamela, Darius did not give up the hope of turning the situation to his advantage, preparing a new army at Ecbatana, in Media⁷⁵. What did Alexander get from the Gaugamela victory? Alexander was aware that "two kings could not have reigned at the same time"⁷⁶. The solution was Darius' death, otherwise the fights would have gone on and the luck could not have been on Alexander's side every time.

Alexander is chasing Darius. What was the use of the gained victories without catching him? Bessus, Darius' satrap in Bactria murdered him and declared himself Great King and promised the enrolled people to take over the war. By doing this, the problem was the same but with different characters.

3.4 Alexander's Prospects after the Defeat of Dareios III

Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela were the three victories that confirmed the superiority of the Macedonian falanges in the confrontation with the enormous Persian Armies and which

confirmed Alexander the Great's military genius. Granicus ensured his supremacy in Ionia and Asia Minor. Issus helped him rule Syria, Phoenicia and Egypt. Gaugamela opened the gates of Babylon and Central Asia. Even so Alexander is still an ordinary conqueror.⁷⁷

Alexander was doomed to carry on with the burden of war to consolidate his conquests, being aware that the conquered peoples were restrained only by weapon power and that if he left he would have to give all these up.

CONCLUSION

The first years of his Asian campaigns show the fact that, at first, Alexander did not intend to conquer the entire Persian Empire and then the entire known world, as can be inferred from his last plans, passed on by the ancient literary tradition.⁷⁸

Only later at Hecatompylos (330 BC) before Darius' lifeless body did he undergo the great change. There could have sprouted the idea of creating a universal monarchy by putting together the Orient and the Occident.⁷⁹

The way Alexander managed and solved crisis situations proved him a hero. At a tender age, with few resources and surrounded by enemies, Alexander the leader of a small state the size of Macedonia, created an empire he had not even thought about at the time of taking over the reign.

There is no doubt that the first six years of reign were critical for Alexander, and the manner he overcame those moments can only attract more attention to the one who has fascinated an enormous number of readers since Antiquity.

¹ V. Lica „*Dacă eu aş fi Alexandru*” în Omagiu istoricului Constantin Buşe, Editura Pallas, Focşani, 2004, p. 14

- ² C. Bradford Welles apud C. A. Robinson, Jr., *The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great*, *The American Historical Review*, vol. 62,ian, 1957, p. 326
- ³ H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols., Munich, 1926, apud C. A. Robinson, Jr., *The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great*, *The American Historical Review*, vol. 62,ian, 1957, p. 326
- ⁴ U. Wilcken, *Alexander der Grosse*, Leipzig, 1931, apud C. A. Robinson, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 326
- ⁵ F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse*, Graz, 1949, apud C. A. Robinson, Jr., *op. cit.* p. 326
- ⁶ W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1948, apud C. A. Robinson, Jr., *op. cit.* p. 326
- ⁷ W. Tarn apud Ron K. Unz, *Alexander's Brothers?*, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 105, 1985, p. 171
- ⁸ R. Cohen apud P. Briant, *Alexandru cel Mare*, p.8
- ⁹ G. Radet, *Alexandre le Grand*, Paris 1931, p. 13-27
- ¹⁰ G. Wirth apud V. Lica, *op. cit.*, p. 28
- ¹¹ A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire. The reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge, 1988, p.25
- ¹² N.G.L. Hammond; F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia*, vol. III, 336-167 B.C., Oxford, 1988, p.12
- ¹³ Plutarh, IX. 11
- ¹⁴ <http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia>
- ¹⁵ M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Succession and regency in Classical Macedonia*, în *Ancient Macedonia. Fourth international symposium Tessaionike*, 1986, p.282
- ¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p.286
- ¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p.281
- ¹⁸ <http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia>
- ¹⁹ *Ibidem*
- ²⁰ * see also the murder of Archelaus in 399 a. Chr., of Alexandru al II-lea in the summer of 368 a. BC, of Orestes in 396a. BC., of Perdikkas III- (killed during the battles with illyrians), of Philip II in the summer of 336 BC
- ²¹ Al. Suceveanu, *Alexandru cel Mare*, București, 1993, p.46
- ²² W. Heckel, *Factions and Macedonian politics in the reign of Alexander the Great*, în *Ancient Macedonia*, p.305
- ²³ V. Strouve; D. Kalistov, *Grecia antică*, București 1958, p.563
- ²⁴ *Ibidem*, p.565
- ²⁵ *Ibidem*, p.563
- ²⁶ N.G.L. Hammond; F.W. Walbank, *op. cit.*, p.11-12
- ²⁷ Al. Suceveanu, *op. cit.*, p.46-48
- ²⁸ <http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia>

- ²⁹ A.B. Bosworth, *op.cit.*, p.7
- ³⁰ M. B. Hatzopoulos, *op.cit.*, p. 290
- ³¹ Plutarh, IX, IX, 3
- ³² Ibidem
- ³³ Ibidem
- ³⁴ N.G.L. Hammond;F.W.Walbank, *op.cit.*, p.3
- ³⁵ Arrianus, , I, 25,1-2; I.25.3; Curtius, 7.1.5;Justin XI, VII,1
- ³⁶ Curtius7,1.7, p.130-131: „ Because he was the first to bow before him as a king, his execution was suspended but he was not escused for his culpability.”
- ³⁷ E. D. Carney, *Alexander the Lyncestian :the disloyal opposition*, in Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, vol. 21,1980, p. 25
- ³⁸ Curtius, 6.9.17
- ³⁹ J.R. Ellis, *Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II and Alexander the Great*, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 91, 1971, p. 15-24
- ⁴⁰ N.G.L. Hammond;G.T. Griffith, , *A History of Macedonia*,vol. II 550-336 B.C., Oxford, 1979, p. 702-704. Griffith sustains that it is a literary misinterpretation, arguing that there is no evidence to certify the reign of Amyntas IV and that it is unlikely for the Boeotians to accept a rebel as king of the Macedonians;
- ⁴¹ N.G.L. Hammond;G.T. Griffith, *op.cit.*,p. 651; Hammond places the visit to Levadia during the time when, in his opinion, Amyntas could have been king, and Philip II regent;
- ⁴² R. M. Errington, *Macedonian „Royal Style” and Its Historical Significance*, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 94. , 1974, p. 20-37
- ⁴³ Justin, XI,2,1-2; The suggestion that Caranos could have been Phila’s son , Philip II’s second wife, is accepted by H. Berve,(*Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, Munich, 1926) and was adopted by the majority of the researchers, especially the German ones cf. Ron K. Unz, *Alexander’s Brothers?*,in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol.105. ,1985, p.173
- ⁴⁴ N.G.L. Hammond; F.W.Walbank, *op.cit.*, p. 4
- ⁴⁵ Diodor, XVII, 2.2
- ⁴⁶ A.B. Bosworth, *op.cit.*, p.7
- ⁴⁷ Arrianus, VII.9.6; Curtius, X.2.24.
- ⁴⁸ F. Rebuffat , *Alexandre de Grant et les problemes financiers au debut de son regne* (été 336- printemps 334), Revue Numismatique 25 (1983), p. 43-52
- ⁴⁹ Diodor, XVII.2.2; XVII.4.5; Plutarh., , IX. 11. 6.
- ⁵⁰ A.B. Bosworth, *op.cit.*, p.188
- ⁵¹ S. Pelman, *The Coins of Philip II and Alexander the Great and their pan -hellenic propaganda*, in The Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of The Royal Numismatic

- Society, seventh series, vol. V, Londra, 1965, p.65
- ⁵²Curtius, I.V. 7.
- ⁵³*** *Pagini alese din oratorii greci*, Antologie, bibliographical notes and translation by Andrei Marin, foreword and explanatory notes by Maria Marinescu Hîmu, București, vol 2, 1969,p.19
- ⁵⁴N.G.L. Hammond- G.T. Griffith, *op.cit.*, p.596
- ⁵⁵N.G.L. Hammond - F. W.Walbank, *op.cit.*, p.16
- ⁵⁶*the word alliance -symmachia – is apparently not present, in the treaty. However, any mutual peace is virtually an alliance against the ones who break the law, cf. Pierre Carlier,*op.cit.* p.120
- ⁵⁷Adelina Piatkowski, *op.cit.* , p. 282
- ⁵⁸P.A. Brunt,,*The Aims of Alexander*, Greece & Rome, 2 nd Ser, vol.2 , nr. 2, Alexander the Great, 1965, p. 206
- ⁵⁹J. D. Grainger, *Alexander the Great failure. The Collapse of the Macedonian Empire*, London, 2007, p. 64
- ⁶⁰S. Pelman, *op.cit.*, p.65
- ⁶¹Arrianus, I. 7. 1-4
- ⁶²J. D. Grainger, *op.cit.*, p. 69
- ⁶³A.B. Bosworth, *op.cit.*, p. 198
- ⁶⁴A.B. Bosworth, Alexander the Great and the Declin of Macedon, în The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 106, 1986, p.8
- ⁶⁵J. D. Grainger, *op.cit.*, p. 80
- ⁶⁶A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire.The reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge,1988., p. 264
- ⁶⁷Ibidem., p.23 : “ the death on October day 336 a. BC gave rise to a crisis ”
- ⁶⁸Vasile Lica, *op.cit.* p.47
- ⁶⁹F. Rebuffat
- ⁷⁰P. Briant, *op.cit.*, p. 25
- ⁷¹J.B. Bury ; Russell Meiggs, *Istoria Greciei până la moartea lui Alexandru cel Mare*, revised fourth edition, Translated by Diana Stanciu, 2006,p. 457
- ⁷²Wirth, apud V. Lica, *op.cit.* , p.46
- ⁷³Wirth, *Alexandergeschichte*, 107, apud V. Lica, *op.cit.* p.49
- ⁷⁴P. Briant ,*op.cit.*, p. 67
- ⁷⁵Ibidem, p. 29
- ⁷⁶Diodor, XVII. LIV. 5
- ⁷⁷Benoist-Mechin , *Alexandru cel Mare , sau Visul depășit; Traducere de Crina Coșoveanu , București, 1994* . , p.11
- ⁷⁸V. Lica ,*op.cit.*, p. 35
- ⁷⁹Benoist-Mechin , *op.cit.* , p.11

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